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Checking software integrity is a fundamental problem of system security. Many ap-
proaches have been proposed trying to enforce that a device runs the original code. Software-
based methods such as hypervisors, separation kernels, and control flow integrity checking
often rely on processors to provide some form of separation such as operation modes and
memory protection. Hardware-based methods such as remote attestation, secure boot, and
watchdog coprocessors rely on trusted hardware to execute attestation code such as verifying
memory content and examining signatures appearing on buses. However, many embedded
systems do not possess such sophisticated capabilities due to prohibitive hardware costs, un-
acceptably high power consumption, or the inability to update fielded components. Further,
security assumption may become invalid as time goes by. For Systems-on-Chip (SoCs), in
particular, internal activities cannot be observed directly, while in non-SoCs, sniffing bus
traffic between constituent components may suffice for integrity checking.
A promising approach to check software integrity for resource-constrained SoCs is through
side-channels. Side-channels have been used mostly for attacks, such as eavesdropping from
vibration of glass or plant leaves, fingerprinting machines from traffic patterns, or extracting
secret key materials of cryptographic routines using power consumption measurements. In
this work, side-channels are used to enhance rather than undercut security. First, we study
the relationships between the internal states of a target device and side-channel information.
We use the uncovered relationships to monitor the internal state of a running device and
determine whether the internal state is an expected one. An unexpected state may be a sign
of incorrect execution or malicious activity.
To further explore the possibilities inherent in side-channel-based software integrity check-
ing, we investigate various hardware platforms, representative of different degrees of knowl-
edge of the hardware from the side-channel profiling point of view. In other words, side-
channel information is extracted by black-, grey-, and white-box analysis. Each one involves
unique challenges requiring different techniques to successfully derive “side-channel profiles”.
We can use these profiles to detect unexpected states with extremely high probability, even
when an adversary knows that their code may be subject to side-channel analysis, i.e., the
methodology is robust to side-channel-aware adversaries.
The research includes
1. Constructing systematic approaches for black- and grey-box profiling of side channels
(and comparing them to white-box analysis);
2. Designing custom measurement instrumentation; and
3. Developing techniques for monitoring and enforcing software integrity utilizing side-
channel profiles.
We introduce the term “side-channel programming” to refer to techniques we design in
which developers explicitly utilize side-channel characteristics of existing hardware to opti-
mize run-time software integrity checking, creating executable code which is more conducive
to side-channel-based monitoring. Compared with other software integrity checking tech-
niques, our approach has numerous benefits. Among them are that the measurement process
is non-invasive, non-interruptive, and backward-compatible in that it does not require any
hardware modification, meaning our approach works with processors that do not include
security features. Our method can even be used to augment existing protection mechanism,
as it works even when all security mechanisms internal to the device fail.
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Abstract
Checking software integrity is a fundamental problem of system security. Many ap-
proaches have been proposed trying to enforce that a device runs the original code. Software-
based methods such as hypervisors, separation kernels, and control flow integrity checking
often rely on processors to provide some form of separation such as operation modes and
memory protection. Hardware-based methods such as remote attestation, secure boot, and
watchdog coprocessors rely on trusted hardware to execute attestation code such as verifying
memory content and examining signatures appearing on buses. However, many embedded
systems do not possess such sophisticated capabilities due to prohibitive hardware costs, un-
acceptably high power consumption, or the inability to update fielded components. Further,
security assumption may become invalid as time goes by. For Systems-on-Chip (SoCs), in
particular, internal activities cannot be observed directly, while in non-SoCs, sniffing bus
traffic between constituent components may suffice for integrity checking.
A promising approach to check software integrity for resource-constrained SoCs is through
side-channels. Side-channels have been used mostly for attacks, such as eavesdropping from
vibration of glass or plant leaves, fingerprinting machines from traffic patterns, or extracting
secret key materials of cryptographic routines using power consumption measurements. In
this work, side-channels are used to enhance rather than undercut security. First, we study
the relationships between the internal states of a target device and side-channel information.
We use the uncovered relationships to monitor the internal state of a running device and
determine whether the internal state is an expected one. An unexpected state may be a sign
of incorrect execution or malicious activity.
To further explore the possibilities inherent in side-channel-based software integrity check-
ing, we investigate various hardware platforms, representative of different degrees of knowl-
edge of the hardware from the side-channel profiling point of view. In other words, side-
channel information is extracted by black-, grey-, and white-box analysis. Each one involves
unique challenges requiring different techniques to successfully derive “side-channel profiles”.
We can use these profiles to detect unexpected states with extremely high probability, even
when an adversary knows that their code may be subject to side-channel analysis, i.e., the
methodology is robust to side-channel-aware adversaries.
The research includes
1. Constructing systematic approaches for black- and grey-box profiling of side channels
(and comparing them to white-box analysis);
2. Designing custom measurement instrumentation; and
3. Developing techniques for monitoring and enforcing software integrity utilizing side-
channel profiles.
We introduce the term “side-channel programming” to refer to techniques we design in
which developers explicitly utilize side-channel characteristics of existing hardware to opti-
mize run-time software integrity checking, creating executable code which is more conducive
to side-channel-based monitoring. Compared with other software integrity checking tech-
niques, our approach has numerous benefits. Among them are that the measurement process
is non-invasive, non-interruptive, and backward-compatible in that it does not require any
hardware modification, meaning our approach works with processors that do not include
security features. Our method can even be used to augment existing protection mechanism,
as it works even when all security mechanisms internal to the device fail.
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Electronic devices have become an integral part of our everyday life. From computers to
electric cars to insulin pump to Process Logic Controls (PLCs) in industry, most electronic
devices nowadays are cyber systems which are composed of one or more processors and are
controlled by software. Since many of these devices are essential to our safety and well-being,
verifying their integrity is an important task. Developers traditionally focus on realizing
device functionality, while ignoring the fact that an attacker can change the behavior of a
device by overwriting its program and/or data locally or remotely.3
Verifying software integrity is challenging. First, cyber devices are of great variety. They
may be composed of general-purpose microprocessors, graphics processing units (GPUs),
microcontrollers (µCs), digital signal processors (DSPs), complex programmable logic devices
(CPLDs), field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), or diverse application-specific integrated
circuits (ASICs). The processor architecture may be von Neuman or Harvard, the instruction
set may be reduced instruction set computer (RISC) or complex instruction set computer
(CISC), the word size may be 8-bit or 64-bit, pipelining may be none or super-scalar, caches
may be zero or several megabytes, etc. While the variety of cyber systems helps in preventing
“single point of failure” in which a security breach of one processor will affect all systems, it
also limits the applicability of any security mechanisms. For example, the security problems
of FPGAs are very different from those of microprocessor-based systems.4;5
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Second, many cyber devices are designed to realize special functionality, and are often
of very restricted resources. These devices are loosely referred to as “embedded systems”.
The term “embedded” means the device is a system embedded within a larger system.
Typical embedded systems are the control unit of an electronic thermostat that determines
when to stop boiling the water, the Electronic Brake Control Module of a car that controls
how to lock brakes, and the reactor shutdown unit of a nuclear power plant that decides
whether to terminate the reactor in an emergency so that the entire town can be saved
from meltdown. Since these devices are designed to accomplish very specific tasks, they are
often very small and highly optimized systems that may consist of an 8-bit processor and
several kilo-bytes of memory. The simplicity of these systems, especially the common missing
of security mechanisms in legacy devices, facilitates tampering. To guarantee integrity of
these systems, without updating them with sophisticated but costly processors or security
modules, requires innovative work.
In this thesis, several integrity checking approaches are presented with the goal of en-
suring software integrity on various hardware platforms. These approaches are based on
“side-channels” of a device. Side-channels can be defined as any channels that are not the
main communication channel of a device. The term “side” is used to infer that the chan-
nel carries information as a side-effect of running desired functionality on a physical device.
Common side-channels are power consumption, electromagnetic radiation, timing and quan-
tity of traffic, thermal and light imaging, object vibrations and movement, etc.6–10 There
are also some uncommon side-channels, such as processor cache misses and the /proc virtual
filesystem. Historically, side-channels have been used for a long time to penetrate a seem-
ingly closed system. Here they are used instead for constructive purpose – checking software
integrity of diverse devices in which security mechanisms have not ever been built in.
There are two types of integrity checking schemes that are proposed in this thesis. One
is pure passive, which does not require the target device to modify its hardware or software.
The other is a design-for-security scheme in which software of a device is rewritten based
on the side-channel characteristics of its hardware so that the integrity of the software can
be verified during device execution. Both schemes do not require modification of hardware
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or interruption of device execution. The second scheme is useful in scenarios where the first
scheme is not applicable due to side-channel features of the target hardware.
The side-channel-based software integrity checking schemes proposed in this thesis are
external to the target device (c.f. Section 2.2.1). The idea is to first extract side-channel
information and correlate it with the internal state of a running device, and then verify
real-time side-channel emanations of the target device against desired values, without any
explicit checking procedures within the device. Compared with other software integrity
checking techniques, this approach has numerous advantages, such as incurring low or no
overhead to existing systems, easy to deploy and upgrade the verification algorithms, no
interruptions of normal execution, low or no visibility to attackers who penetrate the target
device, applicable to legacy and deployed systems. An external verifier is more robust than
internal verifiers which are confined by the hardware resources of the target device. A verifier
that constantly observe the runtime behavior of the target device is able to defend against
more sophisticated attacks such as code-reuse attacks and data-based attacks. In particular,
security assumptions always weakens with time. The side-channel-based methods can detect
tampering and verify validity of security assumptions without modifying original systems,
given that side-channel analysis of the system proves so.
However, this approach poses significant challenges. First, we usually only have very
limited knowledge of the target hardware platforms. Very little information can be derived
for side-channel profiling from the released documents by the hardware manufacturers. Sec-
ond, noise plays an important role in the success of our study. We must carefully design
experimental instrumentation and data processing algorithms to minimize the effect of noise.
Third, our integrity checking approach must be accurate enough to deal with compact mal-
ware that is potentially as short as a single instruction. Fourth, we must be able to secure
against side-channel-aware attackers who may write malware that minimizes side-channel
deviations. Last but not least, our verification approach must be realistic. Although it is
theoretically possible to verify every aspect of an integrated circuit through micro-probing
and microscoping, it is not practical to perform such analysis on every device that needs
integrity checking, due to the high cost of testing equipment and time and expertise needed
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to perform such verification.
In this thesis, the feasibility and generality of using side-channels for software integrity
checking in diverse hardware platforms is explored. Since increasing side-channel leakage
may violate EMI/EMC requirements. We have not made any effort to increase side-channel
emanations but have instead measured the inherent side-channels of a target device. A
systematic approach is present for efficiently analyzing side-channel characteristics of a target
device over the entire instruction set. The effectiveness of this approach is shown by clock-
cycle-accurate side-channel profiling of various SoCs with different degrees of knowledge on
the system. The performance of the proposed side-channel-based software integrity checking
schemes is quantified by the very low probability that a tampering is not detected from side-
channel measurements, given both conventional attackers and side-channel-aware attackers
who actively try to evade side-channel-based integrity checking.
1.1 Organization
Chapter 1 gives a brief introduction of the motivation. The background information and com-
mon related work are given in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 describes the approach to profile the
side-channel emanations of a microcontroller with high accuracy that enables side-channel-
based software integrity checking. Based on the side-channel-model obtained in Chapter 3,
Chapter 4 proposes a novel Design-for-Security approach that utilizes side-channel character-
istics of a black-box device to write code with guaranteed integrity. Chapter 5 presents the
research of side-channel-based software integrity checking on a distinct hardware platform –
FPGA. Three different SoCs implemented on the FPGA are studies to show the effective-
ness, efficiency, and generality of the proposed approach. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the




2.1 Hardware platforms and security problems
One of the major difficulties in securing cyber systems is diversity. Early systems are com-
posed of separate components, and it is easy to observe the structure and model of the
system. It is also easy to analyze the functionality of the system by sniffing the signals be-
tween components (chips). From the perspective of software integrity checking, this system
organization is beneficial in that the designers and testers can identify tampering and faults
conveniently by using low-cost tools such as oscilloscopes and logic analyzers. On the other
hand, attackers can reverse-engineer and clone the system in the same way.
With the emergence of microcontrollers, the CPU, memory, and common peripherals
become integrated in a single chip package. Such a system is called System-on-a-Chip (SoC)
and has become very common in cyber devices, especially embedded systems. Today’s SoCs
are composed of not only the traditional digital parts such as the processor, memory and
popular I/O controllers, but also analog and mixed-signal parts including oscillators and
phase-locked loops (PLL), analog-to-digital converters (ADCs), digital-to-analog converters
(DACs), temperature sensors, and radio-frequency units to interface with WiFi, Bluetooth,
and ZigBee wireless networks. Programmable hardware, such as CPLDs and FPGAs, has
also become more favorable to SoC designs, by integrating “hard-core” processors and analog
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components such as ADCs and DACs. By combining most components into one silicon
substrate and by controlling the device with software stored in internal memory, SoCs are
hard to reverse-engineered using traffic sniffing. Debugging and examining runtime signals
are at the meantime difficult, if not using built-in debugging mechanisms such as JTAG.
However, it is not at all impossible to observe the internal structure and signals of SoCs.
At the lowest level, wafer fabrication plants and chip manufacturers are equipped with
process control and failure analysis tools such as scanning electron microscopes (SEMs),
transmission electron microscopes (TEMs) and focused ion beam (FIB) machines that are
able to examine and modify nanometer scale structures.11;12 Microprobing can measure the
state of a SRAM cell or even transistor.13–15 Often the plastic package of the chip is etched off
in a corrosive acid solution, e.g., hot fuming nitric acid. For hermetic and ceramic packages,
mechanical or thermal treatment may be used.12 The silicon may be accessed from the back
side of the chip, or the metal layers need to be removed layer by layer.11 These techniques
are the “ultimate” tools for analyzing or modifying target cells or transistors, especially
memory cells that store secret keys or security fuses. They however require invasive access
to the DUT and very expensive equipment which is not available for ordinary companies
and university labs. Another disadvantage is that these techniques do not scale well for
large circuits when design details are unknown. Today’s ultra-large-scale integration (ULSI)
circuits may be composed of hundreds of millions of CMOS transistors. The cost of a full
chip reverse engineering is estimated to be around 100 thousands of Euros for a 130nm
technology chip containing 100k logic gates.16
Semi-invasive analysis only requires depackaging the chip with the passivation layer in-
tact.11;17;18 Semi-invasive techniques require less expensive equipment but can achieve similar
degree of control over the DUT. It is possible to extract information from internal memory
such as SRAM and EEPROM, and to modify SRAM content and change the state of any
individual CMOS transistor.11
By using invasive and semi-invasive analysis, it is fundamentally possible to verify the
integrity of any cyber device, since every internal signal can be read out given enough time
and equipment. In practice, however, such analysis is too expensive, especially for long-
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term and bulk verification. In addition, it is not practical to apply semi-invasive analysis or
invasive analysis for software integrity checking of deployed devices.
One solution is to combine invasive and semi-invasive analysis with non-invasive analysis.
Non-invasive analysis often utilizes “side-channel” emanations of a device to infer its internal
activities. Side-channel information such as power consumption, temperature, and electro-
magnetic emanations can be easily measured using low-cost equipment and non-invasive
access to the chip. In19, authors propose the use of side-channel profiles of chips to test
against a “golden sample” for hardware trojan detection. The golden sample is a reference
chip whose genuineness is verified by invasive analysis. Very often a great amount of infor-
mation can be obtained solely from non-invasive analysis. In this thesis, all experiments are
performed by using non-invasive access, low-cost equipment, and passive measurement, and
are favorable to legacy and deployed systems.
2.2 Software integrity checking
We define the general software integrity checking problem as follows. There are two parties:
a prover P , a device-under-test (DUT) running the target application software S, and a
verifier V , a trusted entity who would like to determine whether P runs S or S ′, which may
be a different piece of code or original code but in an unintended execution state. P and
V communicate over an explicit channel C and a side-channel E, as shown in Figure 2.1.
V bases its judgment on evidence that P provides directly (e.g., by signatures) over C or
indirectly (e.g., by timing or EM radiation), over E. V knows the initial configuration of P ,
including hardware and software.
The problem model can be instantiated in numerous ways. In a microcontroller-based
system, as considered in Chapter 3 and 4, S is naturally the software running on the micro-
controller, and P is the hardware including the microcontroller chip and the printed circuit
board (PCB). In an FPGA-based system, as considered in Chapter 5, the situation is a bit
more complex, since for FPGAs, both the hardware and the software are programmable.
The FPGA configuration logic describes both the hardware (processor, memory, IO, etc.) of
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Figure 2.1: General software integrity checking problem with explicit communication chan-
nels and side-channels
the system implemented on an FPGA chip, as well as the application software that runs on
the system. Since there are many methods to prevent reconfiguration of an FPGA device
(c.f. Section 5.3), S is therefore defined as the application software, and P incorporates the
PCB, the FPGA chip, and the FPGA configuration logic describing the hardware of the
system.
2.2.1 External verifier versus internal verifier
Many approaches have been proposed to enforce software integrity. They can be classified by
where the verifier resides. An internal verifier performs integrity checking in the same device
with the target software and thus shares hardware resources with the software, whereas an
external verifier does its job outside the device and therefore often has unbounded resources.
Internal verifiers
Internal verifiers can be either software or hardware. Conventional anti-virus software and
intrusion detection/protection systems are most common software-based internal verifiers
that protect or detect tampering of system software and memory by identifying software sig-
natures, verifying checksums, analyzing traffic and software behaviors, etc. Hypervisors20–22,
separation kernels23, mandatory access control24;25, and control flow integrity26–28, are more
recent internal software-based approaches that provide more confined environments for un-
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trusted software and/or restrict software behaviors in a finer granularity. The common
property of software-based internal verifiers is that the verifier shares the same hardware
with the target software. A verifier that runs on the main CPU of a system therefore can-
not detect tampering on the peripherals (e.g., the Ethernet card29). In addition, usually
software-based internal verifiers detect or prevent “anomalous behavior” of programs by
utilizing hardware security features that provide some form of separation such as different
operation modes and memory protection. While modern computers possess sophisticated
processors that have rich security features, cyber devices as a whole often cannot afford such
a processor because of cost, power, or space constraints. It is not uncommon that an embed-
ded system only has an 8- or 16-bit processor that does not even support integer multiply
operation. Many software-based approaches that rely on hardware-supported separation are
therefore not applicable to such devices.
Software Symbiote30 is a noteworthy software-based internal verifier that does not rely
on sophisticated processors. Its idea is to insert verification code duplicates, which perform
self-checksumming, into host software so that the code gets executed from time to time and
will trigger an alarm when checksums are different. The major weakness of Symbiote is that
the verification code can be inactivated or even removed by a sophisticated attacker who is
aware of the existence of such a protection mechanism, as no protection on the verification
code itself can be guaranteed if a processor lacks appropriate security features.
Another weakness that all software-based internal verifiers share is that the verifier com-
petes for resources with the target software. For cyber devices that perform real-time tasks,
the designers must carefully balance security and real-time requirements, in which case se-
curity is often the one that is sacrificed.
Unlike software-based approaches, hardware-based internal verifiers build dedicated hard-
ware components for software integrity checking and are more or less invisible to the software
under test. Example verifiers include watchdog coprocessors31;32, secure boot, and dynamic
root of trust.33 Often the trusted hardware implements some cryptographic routines and
stores sensitive information such as secret keys. The hardware is responsible for verifying
checksums and signatures of code, such as BIOS code and firmware, and executes the code
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only if the checksum/signature is valid. It may also send out alarms to remote servers if
tampering is detected. In particular, trusted platform module (TPM)34;35 is a security chip
that exists in most enterprise-grade personal computers and costs for only around 1 dollar.35
A TPM measures itself, BIOS code, the master boot record, etc., and stores integrity check-
sums in Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs), which is a protected memory. A verifier
asks the TPM for a signed copy of the PCRs to evaluate the boot sanity. As we all see, the
existence of TPMs does not guarantee that our computers are not tampered. This is because
TPM is a passive device that is operated by code running on the main CPU.35 At best, it
can only be used to guarantee that the boot procedure of a system is clean. If the system is
breached after boot, secure boot with the TPM cannot detect or prevent malicious behavior.
Instead, dynamic root of trust such as Intel TXT36 and AMD SVM37 performs attestation
on the current state of the software by utilizing specific CPU instruction which resets the
TPM PCRs. Nevertheless, verification on solely code integrity is vulnerable to code-reuse
attacks, such as return-into-libc38, Return-Oriented Programming39, and Jump-Oriented
Programming40, which execute original code but in undesired order. It is also vulnerable
to the even more sophisticated data-only attacks41, which execute original code in normal
order but with wrong data. At a finer granularity, a coprocessor can be used to examine
the runtime code that appears on buses and verify integrity by matching code patterns. If
carefully designed, such a coprocessor can detect code-reuse attacks and data-only attacks.
In general, hardware-based internal verifiers are more powerful than software-based internal
verifiers, at the cost of additional hardware and/or more complex CPU and chipset support.
It is also more difficult to deploy new hardware or fix hardware flaws.
External verifiers
The verifier can also be outside of the DUT. Compared to internal verifiers, external verifiers
do not compete for resources with the normal software, or require additional hardware, and it
is much easier to deploy and update an external verifier. External verifiers also have minimal
visibility to attackers who penetrate the device. Moreover, a verifier that is external to a
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device is the only possible integrity verifier when all the security mechanisms internal to the
device fail, or do not even exist.
On the other hand, since the verifier is external to the DUT, it is possible to perform
“proxy attack” in which the attacker asks another device/component (proxy), instead of the
tampered one, to help provide integrity proof to the verifier. Some mechanism must be used
to authenticate the source of the integrity proof.
Software attestation42–44 is a software integrity checking scheme that relies on an external
verifier. Compared to other integrity checking schemes, it has an advantage in requiring no
sophisticated hardware security features or hardware modification, which makes it applicable
to legacy devices. Software attestation assumes that an external verifier has direct access to
the DUT – the device and integrity measurement channel are authenticated out-of-band by
for example visual inspection. When attestation begins, the verifier asks the DUT to put
the device to a known state and compute a checksum of the memory of the device, using a
nonce provided by the verifier. The verifier tests the returned checksum and the time for
the DUT to compute the checksum, so that any tampering of the memory (including all
available registers and caches) will be reflected in the checksum and the device does not
have enough time to remove malware before checksum computation. Software attestation
is able to detect compact malware – malware composed of very few instructions – and is
secure against side-channel-aware attackers. Here timing is a key side-channel information
to make sure that the attacker is unable to evade detection, even if she is able to profile the
computation time of the target device.
Remote attestation45–47 aims to perform software attestation on a remote device. The
major problem is to prevent proxy attacks, as the timing side-channel cannot be used as
a reliable detector of proxies in this scenario. Current solutions are based on a trusted
hardware similar to TPM that is implemented on the DUT, and proxy is prevented by using
the secret key shared by the trusted hardware and the verifier. Remote attestation relies on
the somewhat unrealistic assumption that a remote device cannot be tampered physically
(the trusted hardware is secure) and the secret key cannot be leaked. As shown in later
sections, side-channel analysis, microprobing, reverse engineering, and fault injection can
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fundamentally reveal any secret of a device.
In addition, there are some common weaknesses of software attestation and remote at-
testation. They both attest on known memory configuration, and are therefore vulnerable
to code-reuse attacks, self-delete malware, data-only attacks, and time-of-check and time-of-
use (TOCTOU) attacks (in which the memory configuration is tampered and then restored
between two attestations).
The software integrity checking schemes proposed in this thesis are external approaches.
The proposed approaches have the same benefits as an external verifier has: low or no
visibility to penetrators, low or no overhead to normal software, and easy deployment and
upgrade. Furthermore, the proposed schemes in this thesis, unlike software attestation and
remote attestation, measure runtime software integrity passively, without explicit attestation
procedures, and therefore do not interrupt normal execution or have the TOCTOU problem.
Like software attestation, they do not require CPUs with sophisticated security features,
or modification of the hardware platforms. This makes our approaches favorable to legacy
and deployed devices. To achieve these goals, our approaches utilize non-invasive passive
side-channel emanations of electronic devices.
2.3 Side channels
It is common-sense that electronic devices consume power, cause heat, and emit electro-
magnetic (EM) radiation during execution. Power consumption, temperature, and EM
measurements are resulted from the internal activities of the complementary metal-oxide-
semiconductor (CMOS) circuits that comprise most of modern electronic devices. Therefore
these side-channels, beside the explicit communication channel of a device, also carry infor-
mation about the runtime state of a device.
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2.3.1 White-box analysis of side-channels
Why can power consumption, thermal and light imaging, and EM radiation carry information
about a running device? It lies in the physics of electronic devices. An electronic device
is often composed of analog components and digital components. For software integrity
checking, only the digital part associated with a typical cyber system is concerned. Digital
circuits are always built based on logic cells, which are commonly implemented by using
CMOS.1 Figure 2.2 shows a CMOS implementation of an inverter, a basic unit of digital
circuits.
Figure 2.2: Lumped-C model of a CMOS inverter1
Power consumption of an inverter is composed of static power consumption and dynamic
power consumption. CMOS inverter is designed such that there are no direct connections
between Vdd and Gnd, except a small leakage current flowing through the MOS transistor
that is off. This leakage current is the static consumption, which is usually 1pA. Dynamic
power consumption is caused by internal or output signal switches. For the inverter, dynamic
power consumption is incurred when input is changed. There are two types of dynamic power
consumption: switching power and short-circuit power.1;48–50 When the input switches from
1 to 0 (i.e., output from 0 to 1), the load capacitance of the cell needs to be charged, and
therefore current flows from the Vdd through the load capacitance. Load capacitance incor-
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porates the internal capacitance connected to the output, the capacitance of wire connected
to other cells, and the input capacitance of these cells. Typical load capacitance ranges from
1fF to 1pF. When the input switches from 0 to 1 (i.e., output from 1 to 0), the load capaci-
tance is discharged, and current flows in opposite direction in the load capacitance. Internal
switches can be ignored because output causes much larger power consumption. Short-
circuit power consumption is the temporary short circuit between the two complementary
transistors (PMOS and NMOS) during switching.
Dynamic power consumption of a circuit is often modeled as a sum of power consumed







Ci · Ei (2.1)
Psc = αsc(tr)Psw (2.2)
where Psw is the switching power consumption, f is the clock frequency, Ci is the load
capacitance of node i, Ei is the transition density (frequency of switches) of node i, Psc is
the short-circuit power consumption, αsc(tr) is a linear function of the input transition time
tr. αsc(tr) is decided by a linear curve fitting of simulated dynamic power.





(CL + Ceff,iCI) ·∆Vi · Vi (2.3)
Ceff,i = abs(CLδi + CIδi,i−1 + CIδi,i+1) (2.4)
where Etotal is the total energy consumption for a given bus transition, CL is load capacitance
seen by the driver, CI is the inter-wire coupling capacitance between adjacent signal lines,
Ceff,i is the effective total capacitance of the driver of i-th line, δi ∈ {0, 1} is the normalized
voltage change on i-th line, δi,i±1 ∈ {0,±1,±2} is the normalized relative voltage change on
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i-th line relative to the (i± 1)-th line, ∆Vi ∈ {0,±Vdd} is the voltage change on i-th line.
These power models are often used in combination with SPICE52 simulation in com-
pany with detailed manufacture parameters to estimate dynamic power of small-scale cir-
cuits.48–50;53–55 In practice, however, the complexity and lack of knowledge of cyber devices
prevent such computation. Researchers in turn try to analyze side-channel properties from
real measurements.
2.3.2 Side-channel analysis with limited knowledge of devices
People have studied side-channel emanations from empirical measurements in diverse areas.
Historically side-channels have been used mostly for attacks. In recent years, researchers
start to try using side-channels for constructive purposes.
Power-efficient device design Empirical study of side-channel emissions of various em-
bedded systems have long been studied to optimize power usage and perform EMI/EMC
analysis. Researchers usually obtain power consumption of a target component of a cyber
system by averaging the energy consumed when executing the component for a long time.
This can be done at different levels. For example, application developers usually read the
voltage of the battery of a mobile phone from time to time to determine the power consump-
tion of the system so that some power-saving strategy can be applied. Researchers have also
studied the empirical power consumption of instructions of various devices (most commonly
mobile device) to evaluate the efficiency of the processor design or to guide power-efficient
software development. In such study, researchers often execute the target instruction, e.g.,
multiply, for many times and compute the empirical power consumption or other side-channel
information such as EM cartography by averaging the accumulative side-channel emanations.
This research does not concern runtime side-channel emanations for individual instruction
execution.56–58
Side-channel analysis for cryptographic hardware More recently, side-channel anal-
ysis has been used mostly for attacks. Numerous papers are published each year on how to
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utilize power consumption or EM radiation of cryptographic hardware to break the embed-
ded secret keys. Attackers are naturally of very limited knowledge of the target device, which
yet cannot prevent them from correlating the side-channel emissions of the cryptographic
device with the secret key materials by executing the same cryptographic routine (whose
implementation details or even algorithm is unknown) a large number of times (typically
thousands of times).1;59–62
Covert channel Another (mis-)use of side-channels is data exfiltration, in which side-
channels act as covert channels that silently transmit information about a running device.
Tempest radiation is known as the stray RF emitted by electronic devices that can be used
by an opponent to reconstruct the information about the data being processed.63 Again,
attackers do not need to build complete side-channel models for the target device in order to
achieve their goals. One notable example dates back to 1980s when a researcher described
how to reconstruct the picture on a VDU at a distance using a modified TV set.64 More
recently, researchers showed that it was possible to recover speech from the vibrations of a
potato-chip bag photographed from 15 feet away through soundproof glass.65
Fingerprinting Empirical study of side-channels has also been used for device fingerprint-
ing. Browser response patterns allow websites to track users without the need of client-side
identifiers.66 Ethernet devices can be uniquely identified by analyzing variations in their ana-
log signal caused by hardware and manufacturing inconsistencies.67 For constructive purpose,
IC fingerprinting profiles the power, temperature, and EM (including light) characteristics
of an IC family and further uses the profiles to detect hardware trojans (malicious circuits
substituting the genuine ones).6–10;68 The side-channel measurement of a DUT is compared
with that of a “golden-model” which is invasively examined to ensure that no trojans exist.
Hardware trojans are composed of sequential circuits and/or combinational circuits, and tro-
jans of pure combinational circuits are hard to detect since they are barely triggered except
for specific input pattern. On the other hand, if it is possible to detect combinational tro-
jans, then so for the sequential trojans. With combinational trojans as the target, research
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on IC fingerprinting often scans emissions of the IC for enough time so that untriggered tro-
jan circuits can be exposed from little bias in side-channel measurements. IC fingerprinting
therefore does not concern with runtime side-channel emanations.
Side-channel disassemblers Side-channel analysis of runtime emanations has been stud-
ied for different purposes. One is to recognize instruction operations from side-channel
measurements, referred to as “side-channel disassemblers” in69. Power consumption or EM
radiation of some smart cards and microcontrollers are collected when running instructions
using random data input, and statistic and pattern matching techniques, such as Principal
Component Analysis (PCA) and template analysis, are used to classify among side-channel
measurements of different instruction operations.17;18;69–74 In17 the authors claimed a rele-
vant recognition rate of 96.24% on test data and 87.69% on real code by using multi-position
localized EM emissions and semi-invasive access to a PIC microcontroller. In74, a 100%
classification rate was reported by using power measurements on a AVR microcontroller.
However, neither17 nor us have succeeded in repeating the authors’ results on a PIC micro-
controller, which is a simpler microcontroller.
Integrity checking Another use of runtime side-channel information is to verify system
integrity, as this thesis is concerned. Researchers have analyzed passive system-wide power
measurements of general programs in the hope of detecting anomalous behaviors and/or mal-
ware.73;75–78 These methods, however, assume malware (code) to be sufficiently long and not
written to conceal its side-channel profiles. To use side-channels for rigorous integrity check-
ing, we must consider compact and side-channel-aware malware. Software attestation42–44;79
utilizes the timing side-channel and is capable of detecting malware at such precision. How-
ever, the device must support such attestation, and carrying out the process requires inter-
ruption of the device execution, a particular drawback for legacy and actively-used systems
(see also Section 2.2.1).
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Micro-probing At the lowest level, it is possible to measure the EM radiation of a sin-
gle transistor or SRAM cell by using intrusive measurement and microscopic probing, as
mentioned in Section 2.1. This method however does not scale well for integrity checking
of a complex system that is composed of tens of thousands and more transistors. It does
not solve the problem of efficiently verifying the software of a modern embedded system in
practice.
2.4 Statistics and mathematical background
The proposed approaches in this thesis are composed of two procedures: side-channel model-
ing (profiling) and tampering detection. Side-channel modeling utilizes statistics, mathemat-
ical modeling, and pattern matching techniques to build relationships between the internal
state of a target device and side-channel measurements. Tampering detection is to, based on
the resulting side-channel model, determine from a new side-channel measurement whether
the internal state of the device is a desired one or not. This section will briefly introduce
the statistic and mathematical knowledge that is commonly used in the following chapters.
2.4.1 Pattern matching
Pattern matching/machine learning techniques are widely used in side-channel analysis since
the interested internal states of a physical device are usually finite. For example, the secret
sub-keys are often only 8-bit long, and at most 256 classes are needed (see80 for various ways
of classifying an 8-bit sub-key). So side-channel profiling can usually be applied with general
classifiers. Popular techniques include Support Vector Machines (SVMs), template analysis
(TA), and neural networks.70;80–82 Template analysis has turned out be the most powerful
one and are more relevant with the proposed approaches in this thesis.
18
Template analysis
Template analysis solves a classification problem by first build a set of reference patterns
(templates) and then decide which one of the reference patterns matches best with a new
test pattern; some measure is used to define the distance between reference patterns and the
test pattern.83 Template analysis in the context of attacking cryptographic hardware often
assumes that the side-channel measurements (usually a sampled trace of power consumption)
can be modeled as multi-variate Gaussian signals. Then templates are built by estimating
the parameters of the Gaussian signals for each of the interested internal states (classes) from
executing the device for a large number of times.69;81 For each class ωi, select l samples in side-
channel measurements for modeling, the templates are l-dimensional Gaussian distributions
























(xij − µi)(xij − µi)
T
(2.5)
where xij is an l-dimensional observation of executing the device under ωi in the modeling
data, Ni is the number of such observations in the modeling data.
When given a new observation x, its internal state ωˆ is estimated by applying the Bayes






Template analysis has been shown to be the most powerful tool in breaking cryptographic
hardware, as it can discover secret keys when given only a single test trace.69;82;84 Other
techniques usually requires hundreds or thousands of traces. Template analysis however
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has some limitations. First, template building (sometimes referred to as “device profiling”)
requires full access to the target device, which is not always possible. Second, the profiling
step requires executing the device for a very large number of times under each interested
state, which may make the approach impractical, especially if the state space is large (which
is not uncommon). Third, the performance of the approach will degrade significantly if
the assumed model cannot accurately describe the real measurements or if the pre-selected
l-dimensional observation is not well related with the interested states.
Class separability
A metric that is useful to examine whether the pre-selected observation (aka features in
pattern matching literature) are representative to solve the template analysis problem is the
class separability measure. It tells how likely the classification problem will be solved, since
if classes are not well separable given selected features, then no techniques can achieve good
classification performance.
The upper bound of the minimum attainable error of the Bayes classifier is83:








where Pe is the classification error of the Bayes classifier, ǫCB is known as the Chernoff
bound, p(x|ωi) is the probability density function of features x under class ωi.
For multi-variate Gaussian signals, as assumed in template analysis and commonly in
modeling power consumption and EM radiation:
ǫCB =
√


















where µi is the mean of class ωi, Σi is the covariance of ωi. B is known as the Bhattacharyya
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distance and used for class separability measure of Gaussian signals. The smaller B is, the
larger classification error will be incurred. See Section 3.4 for the Bhattacharyya distance of
power consumption of a microcontroller grouped by instruction operations.
Another class separability measure that does not assume Gaussian distribution is to use













Pi(µi − µ0)(µi − µ0)
T (2.13)
where Pi is the a prior probability of class ωi, M is the total number of classes, µi is the
mean of class ωi, Σi is the covariance of ωi, and µ0 = sum
M
i=1Piµi is the global mean vector.
See Section 5.6 for the J values of EM radiation of FPGA-implemented SoCs grouped by
instruction operations.
2.4.2 Mathematical modeling
When the modeling target is not finite, then classification techniques are not applicable. In
Section 3.4 and 5.6, the side-channel measurement, which is naturally of continuous values,
is the response variable, and depends on internal states of the target device. Note that
literature in attacking cryptographic hardware often takes the side-channel measurements as
the predictor variables (features) and the internal states as the response variables (classes).
When the response variable is continuous, regression techniques are the tools to establish
the relationships between side-channel measurements and internal activities.
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Assume the observation Yt at time t depends on a set of variables ~xt = (xt1, . . . , xtp) at
t, which are often controllable in experiments:
Yt = f(~xt) +Nt (2.14)
where Nt encloses remaining components in the EM radiation including noise and time-
dependent components, Yt and Nt are necessarily random variables. xtj(j = 1, . . . , p) are
called the predictor variables and Yt the response variable.
Regression techniques estimate the function f(·) from a large number n > p of ex-
periments to exercise the controlled predictor variables {~xi|i = 1, . . . , n} and collect the
corresponding observations {Yi|i = 1, . . . , n}. Commonly assumed form of f(·) is linear:
Yi = β0 + β1xi1 + β2xi2 + · · ·+ βq−1xi,q−1 +Ni (2.15)
where βj(j = 0, . . . , q − 1) are constants.
The power consumption model of dynamic switching power 2.1 is similar to this form
when we consider the transition density Ei as the predictor variables and load capacitance
Ci as the constants, or vice versa.
xij(j = 1, . . . , q − 1) may be derived from xij(j = 1, . . . , p). For example, a polynomial
regression model, which is a special case of linear regression, obtain the q predictor from a
polynomial function of xij(j = 1, . . . , p). A second-order polynomial regression model with
two predictor variables is:




i2 + β12xi1xi2 +Ni (2.16)
This form is familiar as the power consumption model of bus signals 2.3 that consider
interference between neighboring buses has the “interaction term” xi1xi2 too.
If the assumed linear function is a good approximator of the real function f(·), then
least-square estimation can be used to estimate ~β = (β0, . . . , βq−1). Least-square estimation
does not make any assumption on the distribution of xij(j = 1, . . . , p), and the resulting
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estimate ~ˆβ is the optimal unbiased estimator of ~β, given E(Ni) = 0, V ar(Ni) = σ
2, where
E(X) is the expectation of random variable X, and V ar(X) is the variance of X.
~ˆβ = (X ′X)−1X ′~y (2.17)
where X = {xij}n×q is the matrix of the predictor variables. However, as shown in Sec-
tion 5.6, directly applying least-square estimation does not always work in practice. The
most notable problem encountered in this thesis is the multicollinearity among the predictor
variables xj(j = 1, . . . , q). Multicollinearity is the phenomenon where some of the predictor
variables are correlated with each other, which will lead to singularity of (X ′X). Several
techniques can be used to eliminate multicollinearity, and will be discussed in details in
Section 5.6.
2.4.3 Variable selection
A common problem that is encountered both in pattern matching/classification and in re-
gression is variable/feature selection. Sometimes variable/feature selection techniques are
also used for dimensionality reduction or noise reduction. Very often in our experiments,
one observation (response) is associated with many predictor variables (i.e., features) and
it is difficult or impractical to exclusively control a small set of variables while keeping the
others constant. One may think with many predictor variables it is unlikely to omit any im-
portant variables that greatly impact the response. However, too many predictor variables
are detrimental rather than beneficial to the classification/regression problem. First, many
more observations are needed to exercise the space of the predictor variables. Second, the
increased computation complexity may make the problem unsolvable. Third, the correlation
among the predictor variables may significantly worsen the model performance.
One popular technique that appears in attacking cryptographic hardware and also in
pattern matching is principal component analysis (PCA). PCA transforms the original data
to a new space spanned by a set of orthogonal vectors, along the first of which the data have
the largest variance, along the second the second largest variance, etc. The set of orthogonal
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vectors are computed from the singular value decomposition (SVD) of the empirical sample
covariance matrix Σ of the original data X 85:
Σ = U ∗ Λ ∗ U−1 (2.18)






(xki − X¯i)(xkj − X¯j) (2.20)
where Xi(i = 1, . . . , p) is the i-th vector of X, each Xi has n observations (i.e. X has
n rows), X¯i is the sample mean of Xi. Since Σ is a symmetric matrix, Λ is a diagonal
matrix and U is an orthogonal matrix of eigenvectors of Σ. The eigenvector corresponding
to the largest eigenvalue is the first principal component, along which the original data have
the largest variance; the eigenvector corresponding to the second largest eigenvalue is the
direction along which the original data have the second largest variance, etc (see85). If we can
keep the eigenvectors corresponding to the first k < p largest eigenvalues, then we only need
to process k variables that have the majority of variance. The dimension of the variables is
therefore reduced. In addition, if some variables in the original matrix are correlated, then
some of the eigenvalues are zeros. We can then ignore the directions that correspond to these
eigenvalues. The transformed data X ′ that keep only the first k eigenvectors are computed
from:
X ′ = XW (2.21)
where W is a p × k matrix that keeps only the first k columns of U . X ′ instead of X will
be used for further processing. If X ′ is used for the normal least-square-estimation of a
regression model, then the procedure is called principal component regression (PCR), which
is a useful technique to eliminate multicollinearity among original variables. Other common
use of X ′ is for pre-processing in pattern matching. The purpose is to reduce dimensionality
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while retaining most representative signals, as the transformed data that corresponding to
small variances are discarded for further processing. It is in particular useful in template





The first device studied to explore feasibility of using side-channels for software integrity
checking is a PIC microcontroller (µC). PIC16F687 is chosen as the DUT, because most pre-
vious research in side-channel analysis for general programs has been done on this IC.17;69;72;74
3.1 Related work
Chapter 2 has already introduced literature on existing software integrity checking ap-
proaches that are either internal or external to the target device, as well as side-channel
analysis for different purposes. The problem of side-channel-based software integrity check-
ing for microcontrollers is distinct from side-channel analysis in other domains in that
• The analysis is on a single-captured side-channel measurement that represents a one-
time execution of some code;
• The analysis is on the entire instruction set instead of a few special instructions;
• The analysis is on the entire trace in one capture instead of a few special occasions in
time;
1This chapter is based on work already published86
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• The analysis is on a black-box device the design detail of which is unknown;
• The analysis must consider compact malware that may be composed of a single in-
struction, or a change of original instruction only on the operands;
• The analysis must consider side-channel-aware attackers who actively attempts to
evade detection by computing alternative code that has near indistinguishable side-
channel measurement from that of the original code.
Side-channel analysis proposed in this chapter for software integrity checking is an “on-
line” verification method in which the runtime state of a device is checked dynamically
against desired one via side-channel measurements, so that “transient” malware or faulty
states can be detected. This approach is in contrast with detection methods for hardware
trojans, which are based on static scanning of the side-channel emissions, such as light, of a
circuit.
Previous research on side-channel-based software integrity checking that performs run-
time verification is either at a rather coarse granularity (e.g., function-level)73;75;76;78, or
ignorant of side-channel-aware attackers77;78, or the effects of data, even operands of instruc-
tions.17;18;69–74 Software attestation42–44;79 utilizes the timing side-channel and is capable of
detecting malware which may be as compact as one instruction. However, the device must
support such attestation, and carrying out the process requires interruption of the device ex-
ecution, a particular drawback for legacy and actively-used systems. Furthermore, software
attestation cannot detect transient faulty states, code-reuse attacks, data-only attacks, and
suffers from the TOCTOU problem (c.f. Section 2.2.1).
As shown in the following sections, the runtime side-channel emanations of a device are
not only determined by the instructions, but also, if not more significantly, by data (con-
text) that are involved in the instruction execution, such as register and memory content.
More generally, the actual internal activity of the device, instead of solely the code deter-
mines side-channel emanations. To guarantee that a single execution of malware is detected,
side-channel analysis must be at the granularity of at least instruction cycles, taking into
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consideration of both code and data. Previous research often tries to profile side-channels ac-
cording to instruction operations by using pattern matching/classification methods.18;69–73;80
We will show in this chapter that such analysis is unlikely to be successful due to the nature
of side-channel emissions, and without considering operands and other context, it cannot
solve rigorously the integrity checking problem.
3.2 Problem definition
PIC16F687 is an 8-bit RISC µC in Harvard architecture. It has a 14-bit program bus,
which is connected to the program flash, and an 8-bit data bus, which is connected to
RAM, EEPROM, PORTs, ADC, etc. The instruction set has 35 operations, all executed
in single instruction cycle, except branches. Figure 3.1 shows the instruction set and the
opcodes. The processor has a two-stage pipeline. Each instruction execution is overlapped
with the next instruction fetch. Unconditional and conditional branches take two instruction
cycles if a branch is taken. A NOP is inserted after the branch instruction and replaces
the original instruction following immediately after the branch instruction. The working
register is one of the two operands of the ALU. There is a 128-byte register file including
general-purpose registers (GPRs) and special function registers (SFRs). Besides this basic
information, PIC16F687 is a black-box to the developers as no details on its architecture
implementation are available in the public documents.
3.2.1 Threat model
Attacker
We assume that the attacker is able to modify the software of the DUT. The attacker is
also able to profile the side-channel emissions of the DUT non-invasively and to modify the
software in a fashion that minimizes side-channel deviation from the authentic code. The
attacker is however unable to inject faults or modify the hardware, including the IC design
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Figure 3.1: The instruction set of PIC16F6872
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and the PCB on which the DUT is mounted. 2 The attacker is not an insider of the chip
manufacturer either.
Verifier
We assume that the verifier knows the initial hardware and software configuration of the
device. The verifier is able to profile the side-channel emissions of the DUT non-invasively.
During the integrity checking process, the verifier cannot interrupt the device execution or
interfere with the device in any way that violates the Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC)
requirements (e.g., by removing the noise decoupling capacitor on the board) so that the
device will not execute wrongly due to side-channel measurement. The verifier is not an
insider of the chip manufacturer either so is only able to perform black-box analysis on the
DUT.
3.2.2 Experiment setup
First, the power consumption of the chip is chosen for side-channel analysis. The ground pin
of the chip is connected to an 82Ω shunt resistor, as shown in Figure 3.2. Voltage drop across
the shunt resistor is captured by a PicoScope 5444B 200MHz USB oscilloscope. The ground
pin, instead of the power supply pin, is used due to limitations of the oscilloscope. To mitigate
the low-pass filtering effects from the chip itself1;87, we set the processor frequency to 125
kHz. The sample rate is 31.3 MS/s. Higher frequency suffers more from the low-pass filtering
effects and does not work with the oscilloscope. However, the result is repeatable with higher
processor frequency, given an oscilloscope with higher bandwidth. The experiment setup is
low-cost and reflects a worse-case scenario from the verifier’s point of view.
The result of power consumption is later compared with that of EM measurement, as
shown in Section 3.4.3.
2In general, if an attacker has invasive access to the chip, she can change the chip in any fashion.
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Figure 3.2: Measurement setup
3.3 A systematic approach for instruction-level side-
channel analysis
Because there are so many factors that may affect side-channel emanations, an ad hoc
experiment will soon become unmanageable. After several attempts, we have developed a
systematic approach for black-box side-channel analysis at instruction-level: 3
• Build semantic models of the instruction set, using known architecture information.
• Generate testing code that is long enough to execute each instruction operation many
times with different operands.
• Calculate the internal runtime state according to the semantic model for each instruc-
tion.
• Cross-validate side-channel measurements and the semantic models with respect to the
predicted runtime states.
3The actual model is at (the finer) clock cycle level.
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3.3.1 Semantic models
Building semantic models of an instruction set includes elaborating the hypothetical detailed
internal activities that happen during an instruction execution, such as fetch, decode, and
data read/write. Based on the limited architecture information described in the PIC16F687
datasheet2;88, we deduce that potential data that may appear on buses, and therefore are
likely to cause the major power consumption, include values of the program counter (PC),
the operands and opcode of instructions, the working register, the GPRs, and the STATUS
SFR.
We initially assume the internal state of the device is:
T = (W,C, F, PC, Iprev, Icurr, Inext, T ype, OPRD1, OPRD2, B,D) (3.1)
where
• W is the working register,
• C is the STATUS register,
• F is the GPRs (indexed from 0x40 to 0x7f),
• PC is the program counter,
• Iprev is the previous instruction (incl. instruction operation and operands),
• Icurr is the current instruction,
• Inext is the next instruction,
• Type is the type of the operation of the current instruction,
• OPRD1 is the content of first operand,
• OPRD2 is the content of second operand,
• whether a branch is executing B(B ∈ {True,False}),
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• D is the result of the current instruction.
Type is one of the instruction categories we summarize from the instruction set docu-
ment2;88:
• byte-oriented file register operation with the working register as destination, e.g., ADDWF
f,W (abbr. wfw);
• byte-oriented file register operation with the GPR as destination, e.g., ADDWF f,F,
CLRF f, MOVWF f (abbr. wff);
• the goto operation GOTO (abbr. goto);
• the call operation CALL (abbr. call);
• the return operation RETURN, RETLW (abbr. ret);
• bit-oriented increment/decrement branch operation with the working register as desti-
nation INCFSZ f,W and DECFSZ f,W (abbr. fszw);
• the bit-oriented increment/decrement branch operation with the GPR as destination
INCFSZ f,F and DECFSZ f,F (abbr. fszf);
• the bit-oriented test branch operation BTFSC and BTFSS (abbr. btfs);
• the bit-oriented set/clear operation BCF and BSF (abbr. bxf);
• the literal operation, e.g., ADDLW k (abbr. lw);
• the nop operation NOP (abbr. nop);
• the literal clear operation CLRW (abbr. clrw); and
• the inserted nop operation when branch is taken (abbr. brnop).
We then build the hypothetical semantic model for each instruction and compute the
associated internal activity. For example,
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′ = mod(W + (f), 256), C ′, F, PC + 1, Icurr, Inext, Inext−next,wfw,W, (f),
False,W ′)
which means, if current instruction is not skipped, then after executing ADDWF f,W, the
internal state of the device will change from T0 to T1, with (1) the working register is updated
with the truncated value of (W+(f)), where (f) is the content of the GPR f ; (2) the STATUS
register is updated according to the result of (W + (f)); (3) the GPRs remain the same; (4)
the program counter increments; (5) next instruction is read; (6) the type of the operation is
updated to wfw; (7) the first operand is the working register; (8) the second operand is the
content of the GPR f ; (9) no branch happens; and (10) the result of the operation is W ′.
The state transition of ADDWF f,F can be defined similarly, with the exception that the result
is stored back to f instead of W . In this way we build the hypothetical semantic models
for ADDWF f,d, ANDWF f,d, COMF f,d, DECF f,d, INCF f,d, IORWF f,d, RLF f,d, RRF f,d,
SUBWF f,d, SWAPF f,d, XORWF f,d, where d is W or F indicating whether the result is stored
to the working register or the GPR. Note that for SUBWF f,d, the result is the truncated
value of ((f)−W ). One of the operands can be both W or the two’s complement of W . We
have tried both cases in further processing. After cross-validation, we find that the original
W is used.
The hypothetical semantic model for CLRF f is defined as:
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T0 = (W,C, F, PC, Iprev, Icurr, Inext, T ype0, OPRD1, OPRD2,False, D)
CLRF f−−−−−→
T1 = (W,C
′, F ′, PC + 1, Icurr, Inext, Inext−next,wff, 0,NA,
False, 0)
where the STATUS register is updated with Z set to 1 and the content of GPR f of F is set
to 0. NA means the value is not available and/or irrelevant.
The hypothetical semantic model for CLRW is defined as:
T0 = (W,C, F, PC, Iprev, Icurr, Inext, T ype0, OPRD1, OPRD2,False, D)
CLRW−−−−→
T1 = (0, C
′, F, PC + 1, Icurr, Inext, Inext−next,wfw, 0,NA,
False, 0)
where the STATUS register is updated with Z set to 1 and W is set to 0.
The hypothetical semantic model for MOVWF f is defined as:
T0 = (W,C, F, PC, Iprev, Icurr, Inext, T ype0, OPRD1, OPRD2,False, D)
MOVWF f−−−−−−−→
T1 = (W,C, F
′, PC + 1, Icurr, Inext, Inext−next,wff,W, (f),
False,W )
where the content of GPR f of F is set to W , the STATUS register is not affected, and the
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second operand is (f), although the value of f is not used.
For conditional branch instructions of type fszw, take the example of INCFSZ f,W:




′ = mod((f) + 1, 256), C, F, PC + 1, Icurr, Inext, Inextnext, fszw, (f),NA,

False if W ′ 6= 0
True if W ′ = 0
,
W ′)
which means, if current instruction is not skipped, after executing INCFSZ f,W, the internal
state of the device will change from T0 to T1, with (1) the working register is updated with
the truncated value of ((f) + 1), where (f) is the content of the GPR f ; (2) the STATUS
register is not affected; (3) the GPRs remain the same; (4) the program counter increments
(see below); (5) next instruction is read (see below); (6) the type of the operation is updated
to fszw; (7) the first operand is the content of the GPR f ; (8) the second operand is not
available; (9) branch (skip) will happen if W ′ = 0; and (10) the result of the operation is
W ′.
The semantic model of conditional branches of type fszw, fszf, btfs are defined simi-
larly.
For instructions of type bxf, take the example of BSF f,b:
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T0 = (W,C, F, PC, Iprev, Icurr, Inext, T ype0, OPRD1, OPRD2,False, D)
BSF f,b
−−−−−→
T1 = (W,C, F
′, PC + 1, Icurr, Inext, Inext−next, bxf, (f), b,
False, (f)|(1 << b))
which means, if current instruction is not skipped, the content of GPR f is updated with
the b-bit set and the STATUS register is not affected.
For the literal operation of type lw, take the example of ADDLW k:
T0 = (W,C, F, PC, Iprev, Icurr, Inext, T ype0, OPRD1, OPRD2,False, D)
ADDLW k−−−−−−−→
T1 = (W
′ = mod(W + k, 256), C ′, F, PC + 1, Icurr, Inext, Inext−next, bxf,W, k,
False,W ′)
The semantic models for other literal operations are similarly defined. Note that for
SUBLW k, the result is the truncated value of (k −W ). One of the operands can be both
W or the two’s complement of W . We have tried both cases in further processing. After
cross-validation, we find that the original W is used.
For the NOP operation,
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T0 = (W,C, F, PC, Iprev, Icurr, Inext, T ype0, OPRD1, OPRD2,False, D)
NOP−−−→
T1 = (W,C, F, PC + 1, Icurr, Inext, Inext−next, nop,W, 0,
False,W )
which means, if current instruction is not skipped, ADDLW 0 is executed with the exception
that no STATUS flags are affected.
Now we consider the situation in which the current instruction is skipped, for example
when the previous instruction is a conditional branch and branch result is True, or when the
previous instruction is an unconditional branch such as GOTO:
T0 = (W,C, F, PC, Iprev, Icurr, Inext, T ype0, OPRD1, OPRD2,True, D)
any instruction
−−−−−−−−−−→
T1 = (W,C, F, PC + 1,NOP, Inext, Inext−next, brnop,W, 0,
False,W )
which means, if current instruction is skipped, then a NOP operation is executed instead of
the original instruction.
Because the architecture information is not complete, our semantic models are only con-
jectures, which can be cross-validated with the side-channel measurements. This is multipur-
pose: first, it is necessary for predicting branches during code generation; second, analyzing
the measurements with respect to the runtime state reveals effects of data versus those of
processing; third, waveform can also be checked against the predicted runtime state in order
to guarantee that the chip functions correctly. The measurement equipment will inevitably
introduce interference to the DUT. For example, using a large shunt resistor for power con-
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sumption measurement eases the experiment by eliminating the amplification circuits which
requires additional power supply and increases cost. However, the shunt resistor also intro-
duces common impedance coupling and narrows the voltage drops between VDD and VSS,
which may cause the device to malfunction. Comparing the waveform against the predicted
state helps to choose the right resistor value.
We generate random assembly code traces and calculate internal activities from the hy-
pothetical semantic models. Random code is used instead of real code to evenly sample the
code space, and avoid overfitting to any specific code base. There is a potential risk that
high-order side-channel characteristics which exists only among some particular instruction
pairs/blocks will be averaged out when using random code. While we may lose some informa-
tion for particular instruction blocks, side-channel properties that are applicable to arbitrary
programs still retain. Once the first-order characteristics is discovered, we can continue to
analyze high-order properties which may or may not exist.
3.4 Side-channel models
The target µC PIC16F687 has 2kB memory. We therefore generate around 1400 random
instructions each time. To have enough samples per operation, file register access is limited
to 12 general-purpose registers and the STATUS SFR. CALL, RETFIE, RETLW, and RETURN are
manually inserted in multiple places so that the program can execute normally. SLEEP (put
device to standby mode) and CLRWDT (clear watchdog timer) are excluded. One thousand
power traces are collected for each program, among which 50% are used for modeling and
50% are used for testing. A typical waveform is shown in Figure 3.3. PIC16F687 has an
instruction cycle of four clock cycles, denoted as Q1 to Q4. The waveform exhibits sharp
peaks at clock rising/falling edges, showing that the low-pass effects are not prominent with
our experiment setup. We observe prominent clock shifting in the waveform, and therefore



























Figure 3.3: A single-captured waveform of executing “MOVLW 0x69” and “ADDWF 0x40,F”
3.4.1 Side-channel models of instruction operations
We first try to analyze the side-channel measurement with respect to the instruction oper-
ations, as done in previous research.17;18;69;72;74 The problem can be formalized as: given
a single trace of power samples of four clock cycles, the verifier tries to recognize one
out of 33 instruction operations based on the profiling model – a typical pattern recog-
nition/classification problem. We have applied various classifiers, including the naive Bayes,
k-nearest neighbor (kNN), SVM, Multilayer Perceptron, and template analysis. Power sam-
ples are with/without feature selection by PCA, mutual information, and linear discriminant
analysis (LDA). The best recognition rate is obtained by using template analysis.69;81 The
power consumption is approximated as multi-variate Gaussian signals. One template is built
for each instruction operation ωi (e.g., ADDWF, BTSSC). For branches, only the first instruction
cycle is modeled, and the second instruction cycle of inserted NOP when branch is taken is
modeled separately. When selecting l samples in one instruction cycle for modeling, the
templates are l-dimensional Gaussian distributions with parameters estimated from power
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(xij − µi)(xij − µi)
T
where xij is an l-dimensional observation of executing operation ωi in the modeling data, Ni
is the number of such observations in the modeling data. When given a new observation x,
the instruction operation is estimated by applying the Bayes rule, which is the ωi that gives






For integrity checking, the a priori distribution P (ωi) is meaningless, since the verifier is
unlikely to know with which instruction the attacker may use to replace the original code.





One template is built for each operation. For file-register operations, each template is
built for writing to the file/working register. In total, 47 templates are built. The resulting
average recognition rate is 45.6%, which is comparable to unoptimized results of69;81 and the
single-location result of17. While some operations still have acceptable recognition rates, such
as CLRW (99.0% recognition rate), GOTO (97.8%), and COMF f,F (95.7%), other operations,
such as CLRF, DECFSZ f,W and IORWF f,F, are almost always misclassified.
To explore the sources of recognition errors, we perform the same template analysis
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but now build one template for each instance of instruction execution. The models thus
incorporate power consumption caused by execution with different operands and runtime
state. For the same data, we build 1435 templates. Applying again the maximum likelihood
criterion, the average recognition rate is surprisingly 99.90%, in contrast with 0.0678% for
random guess. This result however cannot be directly used for model building because this
implies every combination of instruction and data must be exercised, which is impractical
even for an 8-bit processor. We must try a different strategy to solve the problem.
Separability
The difference in recognition rates can be explained by the separability of templates. The
Bhattacharyya distance of power consumption grouped by instruction operations is computed
(c.f. Section 2.4.1) to measure class separability.
Building templates for instances of instruction execution, the 30 errors in 30,000 tests
correspond to 4 out of 1,028,895 pairs that have the smallest Bhattacharyya distances (from
3.98 to 11.45), showing that the multi-variate Gaussian models are good approximators of
the signals. In contrast, for templates of instruction operations, the Bhattacharyya distances
of the majority of template pairs, especially logic and arithmetic operations, are near zero,
corresponding to recognition rates near to those of random guess.
3.4.2 Side-channel models of internal states
Previous modeling attempts imply that the side-channel emanations are related not only
with the instruction operation, but also, probably more strongly, with other internal variables
during instruction execution such as operands and the content of operands. To discover the
effects of runtime states, we change testing programs by modifying only the initial values of
registers. Because register values affect results of conditional branches, code near conditional
branches is adjusted, so that only the instruction immediate after each conditional branch
test is different, while majority of instruction execution stays the same. We rerun the
experiment and record the measurements of the (nearly) same program but with different
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Figure 3.4: Difference of two measurements with the same program but different register
values.
The measurements of “MOVLW 0x9B” have significant difference at the edge of Q2. After
executing “MOVLW 0x9B”, the measurements of “ADDLW 0x83” and “MOVLW 0x6E” are nearly
identical. Executing “RRF 0x71,W” differs at Q2 and Q4, whereas executing “ANDLW 0x60”
has significant difference at Q2 and slight difference at Q4. Q1 and Q3 are on the other hand
almost the same at all time. This phenomenon coincides with the architecture description in2:
for instruction execution, instruction is latched in Q1, data memory is read in Q2 (operand
read), data is processed in Q3, and in Q4 data memory is written (destination write). After
executing “MOVLW 0x9B”, the working register and the STATUS register are the same, 4 and
we deduce that the traffic on the data bus during operand read and destination write is
therefore the same, which leads to the same side-channel measurements. The contents of
the file register 0x71 are different, which results in different traffic on the data bus and
accordingly different measurements at Q2 and Q4. The result of “RRF 0x71,W” is written
4The STATUS register is affected by previous code that is not shown.
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to the working register, and thus causes further differences at Q2 and Q4 when executing
“ANDLW 0x60”. On the other hand, Q1 and Q3 do not show significant difference, even
though the manual claims that data are processed in Q3.
We therefore turn to another distinct strategy for side-channel modeling. Instead of
building templates from side-channel measurements, we try to find regression functions which
can reveal the linkage between internal activities and side-channel measurements. Note
that in pattern matching/classification, the side-channel measurement is the predictor or
independent variable x, and the resulting class is the response y, whereas in regression
analysis, the predictor is internal activity, and the response is side-channel measurement.
Let runtime state at time t be a vector of random variables ~Tt, we assume the power
consumption at t is a random variable Yt and depend on ~Tt:
Yt = fq(~Tt) +Nt (3.3)
where Nt encloses remaining components in the power consumption at time t including time-
dependent components and noise, as in89. Nt and Yt are random variables and Tt is a result
of executing instructions and therefore controllable. fq(q = 1, 2, . . .) indicates that there
might be a set of functions for different stages of instruction execution.
We use the variables of T in the hypothetical semantic model to regress with the power
consumption. In addition, we also include the Hamming distance (HD) and the Hamming
weight (HW) of the variables in the predictors. The HD counts the number of bit differences
between two binary values, and the HW counts the number of 1s of a binary value. We have
intentionally added many variables in the semantic model which are probably more than
necessary (not all shown in Section 3.3.1). This does not affect regression in the sense that
adding more predictor variables will always give smaller mean square errors (MSE).90 Un-
necessary predictors can be pruned afterwards, by using for example t-test of the regression
coefficient for individual predictor.
It turns out that there are strong linear relationships between runtime internal state and
power consumption measurements. For any instruction cycle t, there are four regression
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functions, corresponding to four execution stages:
Yq = ~Tt ~βq + bq +N
where q ∈ [1, 4] indicates the stage, ~βq is a vector of weights (regression coefficients) and bq
is a constant. The noise component N is assumed to be independent of time and stage.
The actual regression models are built for individual instruction categories. We use the
Pearson’s correlation coefficient and the Spearman’s correlation coefficient to measure the
performance of the regression models. For two random variables X = ~Tt ~βq and Y , the










where the covariance of the two random variables are estimated by using the empirical
sample variance. r tends to ±1 as σ2b tends to 0. Spearman’s rank correlation is the Pearson
correlation between weakly-ordered values. Spearman’s correlation is able to measure non-
linear relationships between two variables. If the two variables are linearly related, then the
two correlations are identical. Spearman’s correlation is more sensitive to outliers.
Regression analysis shows that the power consumption of the chip can be accurately
modeled using linear functions of internal activities. Several interesting phenomena can be
observed.
First, the HD of PC and (PC+1) influences the peak amplitude in Q1, regardless of the
operation of the instruction. This corresponds to the fact that the pipeline depth of the
DUT is two: each instruction execution is overlapped with fetching of the next instruction,
and the PC increments in Q1 for instruction fetch.
Second, the content of data already on some internal data bus (which is the result of
previous instruction) and the operand loaded for current instruction influence the peak in
Q2. In Q2, different types of operations (c.f. Section 3.3.1) will load different operands.
And the peak amplitude in Q2 is linearly related to the HD of the data on some internal
bus and the operand. Table 3.1 shows the resulting regression models for different types of
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operations.
Table 3.1: Regression analysis of power consumption in Q2
File register operations
























The file register operations in Table 3.1 include all the other operations not listed in the
following entries, including ADDWF, INCF, INCFSZ, BSF, BTFSC, etc. The literal operations in
Table 3.1 include ADDLW, ANDLW, IORLW, XORLW, and MOVLW. The table shows that overall, the
peak amplitude of power consumption in Q2 is proportional to the Hamming distance of the
value already on the bus, and the data loaded for current execution:
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Yq2 = β ∗HD(previous result, data for current) + b
where Yq2 is in mV, same unit for the following Y s.
There are some interesting discoveries:
• For bit-oriented file register operations and byte-oriented file register operations such
as ADDWF, RRF, INCF, INCFSZ, and BTFSC, the content of the file register is loaded,
regardless of whether the instruction is a conditional branch or not;
• For operations including CLRF, CLRW, MOVWF, the content file register is still loaded even
if its content is not useful;
• CLRW is actually implemented as CLRF 0x7f,W – that is, the content of GPR 0x7f is
loaded in Q2;
• The target address, i.e., the operand of GOTO is loaded in Q2;
• The literal, i.e., the operand of literal operations such as ADDLW is loaded in Q2; The
operand of SUBLW, not its two’s complement, is loaded;
• NOP is implemented as ADDLW 0, except that no STATUS flags will be affected. The
value zero is therefore loaded in Q2.
The plateaus following the peaks in Q2 and Q3, are linear to the Hamming weight (HW)
of the next instruction, regardless of instruction operations :
Yplateaus = 0.836 ∗HW (Inext)− 14.41
with r = 1.00 and ρ = 0.99. Note that the next instruction is still the instruction immediately
following the current instruction even if a branch will be taken after execution (e.g., when
the current instruction is GOTO or BTFSS f,b and bit b of GPR f is 1).
The peak amplitude in Q3 is linear to the Hamming weight of next instruction and the
Hamming weight of current instruction, regardless of instruction operations :
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Yq3 = 1.32 ∗HW (Icurr) + 0.828 ∗HW (Inext)− 31.57
with r = 1.00 and ρ = 1.00. Note that the current instruction is NOP if current instruction
cycle is an inserted cycle after a branch is taken. The HW (Icurr) is therefore zero, regardless
of neighboring instructions. So Icurr of the current instruction cycle is not necessarily equal
to Inext of the previous instruction cycle.
The regression analysis of the peak amplitude in Q4 is shown in Table 3.2. Overall, the
peak amplitude in Q4 is linear to the Hamming distance between data loaded in Q2 and the
result of the current instruction, and the Hamming weight of the next instruction:
Table 3.2: Regression analysis of power consumption in Q4
W as destination
Predictors HD(data loaded in q2, result) HW (Inext) Constant




Predictors HD(data loaded in q2, result) HW (Inext) Constant
Coefficients 3.60 2.15 -23.78
r 1.00
rho 1.00
The operations with the working register as destination in Table 3.2 include: (1) literal
operations such as ADDLW, NOP; (2) the NOP inserted after branch; (3) the unconditional
branch GOTO; (4) conditional branches with the working register as destination, such as
DECFSZ f,W and BTFSC f,b; (5) CLRW; and (6) file register operations with the working
register as destination, such as ADDWF f,W. The operations with the GPR as destination
include: (1) conditional branches with the file register as destination, such as DECFSZ f,F;
(2) file register operations with the file register as destination, such as ADDWF f,F; and (3)
BCF f,b and BSF f,b.
There are also some interesting discoveries:
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• The correlation coefficients rs and rhos are very close, if not equal, to one, meaning that
the linear relationship between the internal state and power consumption measurements
is very strong;
• Operations with the file register as destination consume more power than those with
the working register as destination;
• The resulting data of MOVLW is the new W , which has the same value with the operand
of the instruction; the Hamming distance is therefore always zero;
• The resulting data of GOTO is still the operand (i.e., branch address); the Hamming dis-
tance is therefore always zero; the next instruction of GOTO is the immediate instruction
followed, and is not the instruction at the goto address;
• The resulting data of conditional branches, BTFSC f,b and BTFSS f,b, are always zero,
regardless of whether branch is to happen or not; the Hamming distance is therefore
HD((f), 0) ≡ HW ((f));
• The resulting data of conditional branches DECFSZ f,d, and INCFSZ f,d are, in con-
trast, the incremented or decremented (f) values; the Hamming distance is therefore
HD((f),mod((f) + 1, 256));
• The resulting data of the nop inserted after a branch is taken is W , as if a normal NOP
is executed; the next instruction of the inserted nop is the branch destination;
• The resulting data of literal operations, such ADDLW and NOP, is the new W ; the Ham-
ming distance for NOP is therefore equal to HW (W );
• The file register operations COMF f,d and MOVF f,d always have a constant Hamming
distance, regardless of the destination d; the Hamming distance for COMF f,d is always
eight, and for MOVF is always zero.
The regression analysis also explains the findings of previous template analysis. COMF
f,F has a 95.7% recognition rate which is much higher than other operations. This can
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be explained by the high power consumption cause by the largest Hamming distance value
(eight) in Q4, and also by the destination being a file register. COMF f,F therefore has the
highest power consumption in Q4 on average. CLRW has a 99.0% recognition rate, which is
likely to be caused by the Hamming weight of its instruction being always one.
Double-checking. To increase the potential SNR of operation-related signals, we generate
testing programs composed of instructions of the same Hamming weight. Except GOTO and
instruction types that cannot have the target Hamming weight (e.g. NOP and CLRW), all logic
and arithmetic operations are included. Repeating the experiment, we find that previous
conclusions on the linear models and data dependencies still hold. Measurements in Q3 have
nearly the same value, which can be shown by the small standard deviations (σ) among
peak amplitudes. For execution instances, the maximum σ, occurring at the peak of Q3, is
0.324 mV, in contrast with the maximum σ in previous experiments, which is 4.193. For
instruction operations, the maximum σ is 0.121, in contrast with the maximum σ in previous
experiments, which is 2.495. This implies that Q3 does not yield sufficient margins for
classification. Applying various pattern recognition techniques, the best average recognition
rate is 33.16% for instruction operations, obtained by SVM with polynomial kernel, five-fold
cross-validation. The recognition rate is still much worse than that obtained by template
analysis for instruction execution instances, which is 99.53%.
The relationships reveal several valuable sources of side-channel leakage that can be uti-
lized for different verification purposes. First, they reveal that side-channel measurements
have strong dependencies on data and weak dependencies on instruction operations. This
explains why templates of logic and arithmetic operations have small Bhattacharyya dis-
tances: they have small differences in the Hamming weights of their opcode spaces and the
distributions of operands and results (except for COMF, whose Q4 always has large power con-
sumption since the HD(old value of file register, new value of working/file register) is always
eight). While not helping in template analysis with respect to instruction operations, data
dependencies in peaks of Q2 and Q4 help to match data values with operations. Second, the
strong linear relationships also help to validate our semantic models. Third, the dependency
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in instruction opcodes through Q2 to Q4 leaks information about the control flow. While
not directly revealing the neighboring instructions, this helps to identify certain instructions
such as NOP (having the unique zero opcode) and the NOP executed after each branch. Fourth,
the regression coefficients are in the unit of mV per bit, and are large enough to be resilient
to measurement noise.
3.4.3 EM measurement
We repeat the same experiment by using EM measurement. The EM radiation of the chip
is captured by a hand-made loop probe, which is the same EM probe used in Section 5.4.
The loop probe is place over the power line from the VSS pin which also forms a loop (with
a opening) to the power supply. The magnetic field generated by the power line will cause
voltage drop in the loop probe, which is amplified by a 20 dB amplifier and then sampled
by an oscilloscope, both same to the one used in Section 5.4. An example single-captured
waveform of EM radiation of the chip is shown in Figure 3.5.











Figure 3.5: A typical single-captured EM radiation of the target chip.
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Although the waveform of EM radiation appears to be different from that of power
consumption, it is interesting to observe that regression analysis still works well for profiling
the EM radiation. The peak amplitude at each clock rising/falling edge is linearly related
with the internal activities of the chip. The resulting regression models for individual stages
are slightly different from those of power consumption. However the linear relationships
between EM radiation and the Hamming distances of the data loaded for execution are still
prominent, as shown in Table 3.3 and 3.4.
Table 3.3: Regression analysis of EM radiation in Q2
File register operations

























Table 3.3 shows that in Q2, the linear relationship between the side-channel measurement
and the Hamming distance of previous result and data loaded for current instruction still
holds. The only difference is the values of regression coefficients and the model performance
rs and rhos of the EM models are slightly smaller than those of the power consumption
models.
It can be observed from Figure 3.5 that there is no plateaus following the peaks at Q2
and Q3, which is not surprising since EM measurement will filter out near DC components.
The peak amplitude of EM measurement at Q3 is linear to the Hamming weight of current
instruction, regardless of instruction operations :
Yq3 = 1.48 ∗HW (Icurr) + 18.32
with r = 0.97 and ρ = 0.96. Note that the EM measurement in Q3 is not related with the
Hamming weight of next instruction, unlike the case in power consumption.
Table 3.4: Regression analysis of EM radiation in Q4
W as destination
Predictors HD(data loaded in q2, result) HW (Inext) Constant




Predictors HD(data loaded in q2, result) HW (Inext) Constant
Coefficients 4.42 0.87 27.38
r 0.99
rho 0.99
Table 3.4 shows again that in Q4, the linear relationship between the side-channel mea-
surement and the Hamming distance of data loaded for current instruction and the resulting
data still holds. The only difference is the value of regression coefficients and the model
performance r and rho of the EM models are slightly smaller than those of the power con-





Experiments in Chapter 3 show that the side-channel emanations of a PIC16F687 µC,
both power consumption and EM radiation, are determined by a few internal data transi-
tions.2 This implies that side-channel profiling according to instruction operations by using
general classifiers is unlikely to be successful, because of the weak linkage between operations
and side-channel emissions. Regression model can instead provide highly accurate models.
Profiling the side-channel emanations of the instruction set is just the first step, now we aim
to design a software integrity checking scheme based on the discoveries of the relationships
between side-channels and internal activities.
Now the major obstacle is that, although there are very strong linear relationships be-
tween waveform and data read in Q2 and destination write in Q4, it is the Hamming distance
rather than the exact data that is involved. For a side-channel-aware attacker, it is easy to
compute data pairs that have the same HD with previous data on the bus in Q2, go through
different operations, and again have the same HD with the operands in Q4, thus evading
side-channel-based checking. This is feasible even when considering the Hamming weight
relationships through Q2 to Q4, since the coding of instructions is quite compact.
The good news is that a change in data may have cascading effects: in order to tamper
1Part of this chapter is based on work already published.86
2This is likely to be caused by an internal data bus of large load capacitance.
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with data in one instruction, previous and next instructions must be modified accordingly.
The developers of the µC may utilize the linear relationships between waveform and HW
and HD to guarantee tamper detection, not on the code but on the internal states. Given
an initial state T0 and a desired final state T1, if the developer can find a trace of side-
channel measurements {Q2i, Q3i, Q4i}, i = 1, . . . , n that guarantees the transition from T0
in n steps must end with T1, then the device must function as desired. Any tampering with
the program can either be detected from side-channel measurements, or lead to the same
resulting state.
4.1 Side-channel constrained transitions
Since we can identify the unconditional branch operations CALL, RETURN, RETFIE, and GOTO
separately by template analysis and also by the NOP instruction that always follows, we only
need to consider the literal operations, the file-register operations that perform arithmetic
and logic computation, and the conditional branch operations, for which template analysis
fails and we instead have discovered the linear relationships with the side-channel measure-
ments and data processing in Q2, Q3, and Q4. This includes 28 operations. For conditional
branches, both branch and no branch are considered.
Since there is no ways to distinguish operations on file registers of the same HW (e.g.,
0x41 and 0x50), we define the distinguishable runtime state S as:
S = (W,C, FS,D,B) (4.1)
where
• W is the working register,
• C is the STATUS register,
• FS = fswi|wi = 1, . . . , 7 is a set of sets of GPRs grouped by HWs, i.e., the 64 GPRs
(index i is from 0x40 to 0x7f) are divided into seven sets fswi according to the HW
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of index wi = HW (i); the GPRs of the same wi are in one set and therefore do not
distinguish index order. For example, fs1 and fs7 contains only one member (i.e.,
GPR 0x40 and 0x7f, respectively).
• D is the result of current instruction,
• whether a branch is to execute B(B ∈ {True,False}),
Note the difference in the definition of the internal runtime state here and the definition
of the hypothetical internal state for semantic modeling in Section 3.3.1.
We use the regression models of power consumption for further discussion. Similar analy-
sis can be applied for EM radiation. Since the side-channel measurement is determined only
by a few internal data transitions, for each instruction cycle we only need to consider three
values: (1) q2 = HD(last result, data loaded for current operation), (2) q3 = HW (current
instruction), and (3) q4 = HD(data loaded for current operation, new result). q2 ∈ [0, 8]
corresponds to the power measurement in Q2 of current instruction cycle, q3 ∈ [0, 14] corre-
sponds to the power measurement both in Q3 of current instruction cycle and Q2 through
Q4 of previous instruction cycle, and q4 ∈ [0, 10] corresponds to the power measurement
in Q4 of current instruction cycle, which is adjusted from [0, 8] as instructions with the file
register as destination consumes more power than instructions with the working register as
destination (c.f. Table 3.2).
For a given side-channel constraint of (q2, q3, q4), we exhaustively compute all the possible
instructions and resulting runtime states. For efficient computation, all the possible runtime
states for any instruction cycle is stored as a search tree T keyed by the runtime state
S. The record V of each node of key S is a set of previous state S0i and instructions P0i:
V = {(S01, P01), . . . , (S0k, P0k)} that result in S. The skeleton of the algorithm that computes
a series of possible runtime states, given a trace of side-channel constraints, is shown from
Algorithm 1 to 5.
Based on Algorithms 1, it is possible to compute all the possible final state Tk given the
initial state T0 and a series of side-channel constraints {q1, q2, . . ., qk}, q = (q2, q3, q4) for
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Data: q2, q3, q4, T0 = {(S0, null)}
Result: T1
onecycle(q2, q3, q4, T0)
begin
T1 ←− ∅
for each node (S, V ), S = (W,C, F,D,B) in T0 do
if this cycle is branch (i.e., nop executed) then
if q2 = HW (D) and q3 < 15 and q4 = HW (W ) then
compute resulting S1 of executing NOP
addnode(S1, S, branchNOP, T1)
else
procliteral(q2, q3, q4, S, T1)
procbyte(q2, q3, q4, S, T1)
procbit(q2, q3, q4, S, T1)
Algorithm 1: onecycle: Compute instructions that satisfy a given side-channel constraint
(q2, q3, q4).
Data: S1, S0, P0, T1
Result: T1
addnode(S1, S0, P0, T1)
begin
if S1 already exists in T1 then
get the record V1 of node S1 in T1
add (S0, P0) to V1
else
create empty record V1
add (S0, P0) to V1
add node (S1, V1) to T1
Algorithm 2: addnode: add initial state S0 and a possible instruction P0 to the search
tree of next state T1.
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Data: q2, q3, q4, S = (W,C, F,D,B), T1
Result: T1
procliteral(q2, q3, q4, S, T1)
begin
for each literal operation op do
for each operand opr0 that satisfies HD(opr0, D) = q2 do
if q3 = HW (opr0) +HW (op) then
compute resulting S1 of executing op on the working register
if adjusted q4 = HD(opr0, D1) then
addnode(S1, S, op, T1)
if q3 = 0 and q2 = HW (D) and q4 = HW (W ) then // NOP
compute resulting S1 of executing NOP
addnode(S1, S, NOP, T1)
if q3 = 1 and q2 = HD(D,file register 0x7f) and q4 = HW (file register 0x7f)
then // CLRW
compute resulting S1 of executing CLRW
addnode(S1, S, CLRW, T1)
Algorithm 3: procliteral: find all possible literal instructions satisfying (q2, q3, q4).
Some optimization is omitted.
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Data: q2, q3, q4, S = (W,C, F,D,B), T1
Result: T1
procbyte(q2, q3, q4, S, T1)
begin
for each file-register operation op do
d←− W
// result stored in the working register
for each file-register f in Gw of w = q3−HW (op) do
if HD(D, f) = q2 then
compute resulting S1 of executing op on f
if q4 = HD(f,D1) then
addnode(S1, S, op, T1)
d←− F
// result stored in GPR
q4′ ←− adjusted q4 for each file-register f in Gw of w = q3− 1−HW (op) do
if HD(D, f) = q2 then
compute resulting S1 of executing op on f
if q4′ = HD(f,D1) then
addnode(S1, S, op, T1)
Algorithm 4: Algorithm 4: procbyte: find all possible byte-oriented file register in-
structions (including conditional branch DECFSZ and INCFSZ) that satisfy (q2, q3, q4). Some
optimization is omitted.
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Data: q2, q3, q4, S = (W,C, F,D,B), T1
Result: T1
procbit(q2, q3, q4, S, T1)
begin
if q4 = 0 or 1 then
for each bit operation op do
d←− W
// result stored in the working register
for each file-register f do
if HD(D, f) = q2 and w = q3−HW (f)−HW (op) ∈ [0, 3] then
for each bit b ∈ [0, 7] of weight w do
compute resulting S1 of executing op on bit b of f
if HD(D1, f) = q4 then
addnode(S1, S, op, T1)
for each BTFSC/BTFSS operation op do
for each file-register f do
if HW (f) = q4 and HD(D, f) = q2 and
w = q3−HW (f)−HW (op) ∈ [0, 3] then
for each bit b ∈ [0, 7] of weight w do
compute resulting S1 of executing op on bit b of f
addnode(S1, S, op, T1)
Algorithm 5: procbit: find all possible bit-oriented file register instructions (includ-
ing conditional branch BTFSC and INCFSZ) that satisfy (q2, q3, q4). Some optimization is
omitted.
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k instructions. Knowing the original code and initial state, {qi} can be computed for each
instruction cycle. If we find that the side-channel measurements are the same with {qi},
then we can derive that the final state is one of the state in Tk. Further, if Tk only contains
one record, then we can guarantee that the desired state is reached.
For example, when the initial state is
S0 = (16, 000b, {fsi|fsi = {fij|fij = 0}}, 32,False)
where 000b means three binary zeros.
Given side-channel constraint is {(1, 8, 1), (7, 10, 6), (1, 7, 4)} for three instruction cycles,
then only one final state is reached, namely
S3 = (7, 001b, {fs4 = {8, 0, . . . , 0}, fsi|fsi = {fij|fij = 0}, i 6= 4}, 7,False)
There are 20 possible three-instruction traces that satisfy the side-channel constraints,
e.g., “BSF 0x47,3; ANDLW 0xE7; DECFSZ 0x47,W”, “BSF 0x65,3; ANDLW 0xE7; DECFSZ 0x65,W”,
and “BSF 0x78,3; ANDLW 0xE7; DECFSZ 0x78,W”. However all the traces lead to the unique
final state S3.
Side-channel Programming This leads to the idea of “side-channel programming”, in
which internal state of a program can be verified by simply checking the side-channel em-
anations. If the entire program can be rewritten in a way that all alternative programs
that cause the same side-channel measurements will result in the same final state then the
device can be guaranteed to function as desired, in spite of probably different intermediate
instructions. This notion of integrity is different from conventional notion of verifying the
code. But as mentioned in Chapter 1, verifying the code solely cannot rigorously guarantee
the device is not tampered, due to the existence of code-reuse attacks and data-only attacks.
Unfortunately, because the instruction set of the target µC is compact in instruction
coding and many instructions having the same HW perform completely different operations,
it is not obvious how to side-channel program an arbitrary program, or even whether it is
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possible to side-channel program. To answer these questions, we compute the statistics of
side-channel emanations versus runtime state and instructions to obtain some hint.
4.2 Heuristics
First, we compute the resulting states given 1,000 random initial states and all the possible
qs for one instruction cycle. The average size of the resulting search trees versus q is shown
in Figure 4.1. It is interesting to observe that most qs are not valid to produce any final
states. For the remaining valid qs, the tree sizes are Gaussian/binomial-like. This can
be further illustrated in Figure 4.2, in which the tree sizes versus q2 and versus q3 are
Gaussian/binomial-like, whereas the tree size versus q4 is much more uniform. This implies
q4 does not play a very important role in controlling the number of resulting final states,
which is out of expectation. The combination of q2 and q3 determines, on average, how many
different final states are possible given the same initial state and side-channel constraint q.
The statistics on average is only a primitive result for side-channel programming. Only
those qs that lead to a unique final state is of value to us. We find that for a given initial state,
there are around 7.58% of all possible qs leading to a unique final state for one instruction
cycle. If at each instruction cycle we transform runtime states using one of the 7.58% qs,
then we can guarantee that for each cycle the device computes the desired value.
However, it may not suffice to use only 7.58% qs to transform an initial state to any
desired final state, before the physical program memory runs out. We can assume that some
heuristic function can generate a suitable q based on current runtime state, and the heuristic
function will guarantee (at high probability) that the desired unique final state is reached
within a few steps. For example, the heuristics may allow more than one possible states are
reached at intermediate steps while forcing the intermediate states to converge to a unique
desired final state. This algorithm is shown in Algorithm 6, where the heuristics genq(·)
generates a q for one instruction cycle based on context. The simplest genq(·) is to generate
a random q at each step regardless of current context. An optional throttle value is chosen
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Figure 4.1: The average size of search trees for one instruction cycle: the x-axis is (q2, q3, q4)






Ti ←− ∅, i = 0, . . . , n
add (S0, null) to T0
while i ≤ n do
q ←−genq(context)
Ti+1 ←− onecycle(q2, q3, q4, Ti)
if size of Ti+1 is one then
break
else if size of Ti+1 < threshold then
i←− i+ 1
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Figure 4.2: The size of search trees after one instruction cycle versus q2, q3, and q4, respec-
tively. The x-axis is q2, q3, or q4; the y-axis is the number of nodes of the resulting search
trees.
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4.3 Graph of side-channel programs
Since it is not clear how to design the heuristics that can uniquely transform from any
initial state to any desired final state, we turn to a reductionist method. First, we design
a simple genq(·) that is able to uniquely transform a given initial state to some final state.
Second, we try to link each unique transformation into a program that results into the desired
final state. To do so, we compute a directed graph of runtime states connected by side-
channel programs that guarantee unique transformations of runtime states from verifying
side-channel emissions. That is, each node i of the side-channel programming graph is a
state Si, and an edge exists from Si to Sj only if at least one side-channel program (of
any instructions) exists to uniquely transform Si to Sj. Since computing the entire graph
that connects all possible runtime state is impractical (and unnecessary), we only test the
effectiveness of this approach by computing the graphs for representative values.
4.3.1 Random initial GPRs
First we consider the initial state to be
Sw = (w, 000b, F0, w,False) (4.2)
where F0 is set to random value. We compute the graphs of side-channel programs for 20
different F0s with w ∈ [0, 255] for each F0. For each Sw, we execute Algorithm 6 for 200
times, with genq(·) generates random qs and threshold = 100. We obtain several interesting
results.
First, it is surprisingly easy to obtain side-channel programs. Given the maximum number
of instruction cycles n to be 2, 4, 8, and 16, the number of side-channel programs generated
for any Sw is on average 70, 95, 120, and 136, respectively, for 200 times of trials. The
number of new programs decreases near exponentially with the number of instruction cycles.
When n is 2, 4, 8, or 16, the side-channel programs result in 51, 74, 99, and 115 distinct final
state values, respectively, for any Sw on average. This shows that the side-channel programs
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compute diverse final states for any given initial state.
Among the 51, 74, 99, and 115 distinct final state values S ′, there are 26, 31, 33, and
33 state values, respectively, that have the same values of FS (i.e., FS ′ = F0). Others
have different FS ′ that differ from F0 for one to several GPR values. There are therefore
statistically both side-channel programs that uniquely transform any initial state to resulting
states having different GPRs, and also side-channel programs that uniquely transform any
initial state to resulting states having the same GPRs.
In addition, there are 21, 26, 28, and 28 state values, respectively, that not only have
FS ′ = F0, but also have the resulting data D
′ equal to the working register W ′. There are
10, 12, 12, and 12 state values, respectively, that not only have FS ′ = F0, D
′ = W ′, but also
have the STATUS register equal to 000b.
We can therefore compose a graph of side-channel programs with each node as Sw, w ∈
[0, 255] (note that w = D). Given n as 2, 4, 8, 16, there are 228, 236, 238, and 238 out of the
total 256 Sw that can traverse the entire graph (i.e., transformed to any possible Sw through
side-channel programs), by repeating Algorithm 6, with genq(·) generates random qs. Note
that the graph is a lower bound of the actual graph with nodes of the form Sw because it
does not include the edges that connect two nodes of the form Sw indirectly through nodes
not of the form Sw.
Furthermore, since there are 25, 43, 66, and 82 distinct final state values, respectively, that
have different FS ′, any Sw can transform to a different FS
′ through side-channel programs,
thus connecting different graphs of Sw. Combining the graphs of the same GPRs FS and of
different GPRs will produce a side-channel program that statistically traverses any internal
states.
4.3.2 Zero initial GPRs
Second, we consider special initial states that have all the GPRs of zero values, since after
system reboot, all GPRs are initialized with zero. The initial side-channel distinguishable
states are of the form
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Sw = (w, 000b, {fsi|fsi = {fij|fij = 0}, i = 1, . . . , 7}, w,False)
where w ∈ [0, 255].
For each initial state Sw, we execute Algorithm 6 for 100 times with n = 8 and threshold =
100. genq(·) generates random qs. Then we connect Si to a final state Sj only if a side-
channel program exists resulted in a unique Sj. Note that again the graph does not contain
any nodes not of the form Sw and therefore excludes the edges that connect two nodes of
the form Sw indirectly through nodes not of the form Sw.
We find that 242 out of the total 256 nodes in the graph of Sw can traverse the entire
graph, showing that the majority of the runtime states of the form Sw can be reached by
side-channel programming. Executing 100 more times of Algorithm 6 for each Sw connects
10 more nodes. Executing more times of Algorithm 6 for each Sw is likely to add more edges
to the graph and connect the remaining 4 unconnected nodes. Considering nodes of more
general forms or increasing n and/or threshold is also likely to connect the remaining nodes.
4.4 Other heuristics
The results in Section 4.3 are obtained with the simplest heuristic function: genq(·) uniformly
generates q at each step, without considering context. It is free to choose any other heuristic
functions to obtain desired properties. Algorithms 7 and 8 show two other heuristics we have
tried for genq(·).
We consider the initial state to be in the form of 4.2, with random initial GPRs. Executing
Algorithm 6 by using Algorithm 7 and 8, respectively, we again compute side-channel graphs
for 20 different F0s with w ∈ [0, 255] for each F0. For each Sw, we repeat the computation
for 200 times, with the maximum number of instruction cycles n set to 8. The numbers of
resulting side-channel programs are on average 74 and 180, respectively (i.e., the probability
of obtaining a side-channel program of maximally eight instruction cycles is 37% by using
Algorithm 7 and is 90% by using Algorithm 8). The numbers of distinct final states (as
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Data: C, n
Result: q2, q3, q4
genqec(C, n)
begin





q2←− rand([0, 2] ∪ [6, 8])
q3←− rand([0, 4] ∪ [10, 14])
q4←− rand([0, 10])
Algorithm 7: genqec: Generate qs by considering context C.
Data:
Result: q2, q3, q4
genqless()
begin





q2←− rand([0, 2] ∪ [6, 8])
q3←− rand([0, 4] ∪ [10, 14])
q4←− rand([0, 10])
Algorithm 8: genqless: Generate qs that have fewer possible instructions.
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different side-channel programs may result in the same final state) are on average 66 and 95,
respectively (i.e., 33% and 47%, respectively).
Among the 66 distinct final states by using Algorithm 7, on average 6 (actually 5.65)
have the same values of FS (i.e., FS ′ = F0). Others have FS
′ that differ from F0 for one
to several GPR values. 5 out of 6 final states not only have FS ′ = F0, but also have the
resulting data D equal to the working register. 2 out of 5 final states further have the STATUS
register equal to 000b. The entire side-channel graph for the same F0 has on average 25 out
of the total 256 states that are connected.
For Algorithm 8, on average 44 out of 95 final states have FS ′ = F0. 35 out of 44 further
have the resulting data D equal to the working register. And 13 out of 35 further have the
STATUS register equal to 000b. The entire side-channel graph for the same F0 has on average
204 out of the total 256 states that are connected. Note that above graphs are obtained by
considering only the 200 times of executing Algorithm 6 with nodes of the same form of Sw.
Compared to the results in Section 4.3.1 which uses random qs at each instruction cycle
and ignores the context, Algorithm 8 seems to be almost as efficient in finding side-channel
programs as random qs, while Algorithm 7 is surprisingly less effective. Algorithm 8 is






In previous chapters we have shown that it is possible to accurately profile the single-
captured side-channel emanations of a microcontroller and to perform side-channel-based
integrity checking. One important question is whether or not we can apply the same approach
in general. To explore the feasibility of using side-channels for software integrity checking
on different devices, we choose FPGAs as the next hardware platform to study. FPGAs
provide a uniform platform to implement various SoCs, so we can test whether an approach
that works for one SoC still works for another. Three different Systems-on-Chip (SoCs) have
been studied in this chapter in order to test the effectiveness, efficiency, and generality of
our approach.
5.1 Background
There are several types of FPGAs, among which the most widely used is SRAM (static
memory)-based FPGAs, as this thesis is concerned. FPGAs consist of an array of program-
ming logic blocks, which generally include logic elements, memory, and multipliers (See92 for
detailed description). A programmable routing circuit connects the logic blocks to realize
certain functionality. Altogether, the array of logic blocks is surrounded by programmable
1This chapter is based on work already published91
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input/output (I/O) blocks. Modern FPGAs also include memory blocks and hardwired
components such as hard processor cores, as shown in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: FPGA architecture with logic blocks depicted as blue squares; logic blocks are
surrounded by routing channels; several logic blocks have a dedicated memory column in-
between.
The basic building block of an FPGA device is the logic element, which is essentially
composed of a look-up-table (LUT), a flip-flop, and a multiplexer. Several logic elements
compose a logic block. Logic blocks are surrounded by routing channels composed of pro-
grammable switches and wire segments with different fixed lengths. In SRAM-based FPGAs,
SRAM is used to provide configurability by selecting lines to multiplexers and by storing
data in LUTs. After powered up, the configuration circuit of an FPGA device will initialize
all the SRAM cells with a user provided “configuration logic”, which is in general compiled
from code written in a high-level “hardware description language” by using a series of CAD
tools.
Diverse circuits can be realized by programming the generic LUTs, multiplexers, and
interconnects of an FPGA, including an entire system that consists of a sophisticated pro-
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cessor, memory, I/O controllers, etc. In that case, the configuration logic will describe both
the “hardware” (e.g., the processor circuit) and the “software” which is the content of the
memory.
5.2 Related work
To the best of our knowledge, no previous work has been done on side-channel-based software
integrity checking for FPGA-implemented SoCs. Note that fundamentally, it is possible to
examine every aspect of an integrated circuit, such as state of transistor or SRAM cell, by
using micro-probing and microscoping techniques.93 It is however impractical to use such
techniques on a large scale due to the time and expertise that are required, and to the costly
equipment that is not available to ordinary companies and university laboratories.
5.2.1 White-box analysis of FPGA side-channels
If the detailed design and manufacturing parameters of an FPGA circuit is known, it is the-
oretically possible to compute power consumption of an FPGA-implemented circuit. This
method has been used primarily for designing power-efficient FPGA architectures and power-
aware CAD tools.48;49;53–55 Dynamic power consumption is in general modeled as the aggrega-
tion of power consumed by each node inside an FPGA whose load and parasitic capacitance
is charged and discharged at signal transitions, as well as short-circuit power that occurs in
CMOS inverters.48;49;54 For FPGA-implemented SoCs, however, low-level analysis is imprac-
tical or inefficient, and relies on the knowledge of detailed design information, which is in
general impossible for FPGA developers.
5.2.2 Empirical models of FPGA side-channels
Researchers have in turn tried to profile side-channel characteristics of a target system from
empirical measurements of real boards. Senn et al.58 measured system-level power consump-
tion of the NIOS II soft processor core. Zipf et al.57 performed a hybrid functional- and
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instruction-level power analysis of LEON2, another soft-core processor. However, these es-
timation models profile the average side-channel emissions of an embedded system rather
than trying to infer system state (which program is running and its runtime state) from side-
channel measurements, and therefore cannot be applied to the integrity checking problem.
Passive side-channel emissions of FPGA-implemented cryptographic routines have been
utilized intensively to extract secret materials such as keys that are embedded in an FPGA
circuit.59–62 FPGA-implemented cryptographic hardware can be either based on a general
processor or on a specially designed cryptographic co-processor/peripheral. However, such
analysis concentrates on a few leakage points of the keys and cannot present a comprehen-
sive picture of the dynamic side-channel emissions of an entire embedded system (see also
Section 2.3.2 and 3.1).
Research on passive side-channel emissions of FPGA devices has also been focused on
hardware trojans.9;10;68 The methods used are either similar to differential power/EM anal-
ysis for cryptographic hardware, or are based on accumulative side-channel emanations so
that untriggered malicious circuits can be detected. These methods therefore cannot be ap-
plied to solve the software integrity checking problem, which requires to detect transient and
compact malware that exists for a short time in the memory and does not cause significant
difference in long-term side-channel emanations.
5.3 Problem definition
The threat model for FPGA-implemented SoCs is different from that for microcontrollers





We assume that the attacker is unable to modify or inject faults into the PCB and the
FPGA chip of the target embedded system. This is enforceable in practice using physical
tamper-resistance or tamper-proof techniques.94 Moreover, the attacker is not an insider of
the FPGA or IP core manufacturers, and cannot tamper the FPGA IC design, IP cores, or
the CAD tools, on which we rely to establish the ground truth.
We further assume that the attacker is unable to modify the FPGA hardware configu-
ration, i.e., cannot reconfigure the hardware of the FPGA. This can be simply achieved by
observing the side-channel emissions of the FPGA. During reconfiguration, the waveform of
power consumption or EM radiation will change drastically. For example, the main clock
of the target SoC will be lost. It is therefore straightforward to check that a device is be-
ing reconfigured. Furthermore, this can also reinforced by authenticating the configuration
bit-stream4, or by removing configuration peripherals before deployment.
However, we assume that the attacker is able to modify the application software, e.g.,
modifying the RAM of the device through buffer overflows, data-only attacks, etc. We con-
sider two types of attackers: conventional attackers who cannot profile the side-channels
of the target device, and attackers who are side-channel-aware and thus actively attempt
to evade detection, by crafting the modified software in a fashion that minimizes side-
channel deviations from the original one. Nonetheless, the attacker cannot invasively profile
the side-channels of the target device, which can be again enforced by physical tamper-
resistance/proof facilities. Note that fundamentally, if an attacker is able to invasively profile
a device, then she can reverse-engineer and modify every aspect of the circuit.11
Verifier
We assume the verifier is of very limited capability, so that our approach can be applied
to more general scenarios. We assume that the verifier knows the initial configuration of a
target device and is able to profile the side-channel characteristics only on a different device
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of the same model. The verifier can only perform non-invasive measurements on the profiling
device, which is important for this method to be applied to deployed devices.
We emphasize that the verifier is completely external to the target device, and cannot
modify the device hardware or software to change the nature or magnitude of side-channel
emissions, so that the verifier has the advantage of invisibility to attackers. This is also to
avoid increase EM radiation of the existing device that violates EMC requirements. For
example, the verifier may remove the shielding enclosure for measurements, but may not
remove the noise decoupling circuits, which may cause errors in device execution. The
verifier can only passively measure the target device with equipment that incurs minimal
impact on EMC.
5.4 Experimental setup
For a representative legacy and deployed system, we choose a general-purpose development
board for the Altera Cyclone III FPGA EP3C5E144C8 as the target device. The FPGA
chip is designed for low-cost, small-scale applications. We choose the EM side-channel for
non-invasive measurement, because unlike power analysis, EM measurement can be easily
conducted on deployed systems, as no insertion of shunt resistors or similar current mea-
surement components is required. Our experiments measure the inherent EM radiation of
the target SoC, and make no effort to increase EM emissions to avoid introducing additional
EMC problems. Preliminary test on the chip shows that it is not EM-shielded, which eases
our experiment.
We implement one SoC on the FPGA at a time in the way that the only observable I/O
is a parallel peripheral I/O (the memory chip on the development board is not used). Two
different chips (i.e., boards) of the same model are used, one for profiling and another for
testing.
It is interesting for us to find that several positions on the board emit strong EM signals
of similar waveform. The conjecture is that the EM measurement is similar to power con-
sumption, since a large dimension probe tends to measure global radiation. We have tried
75
(a) The SoC and probe


















(b) A typical waveform
Figure 5.2: Electromagnetic measurement
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both far-field and near-field measurements of EM radiation, and obtained the best result
from near-field measurements with a shielded loop probe similar to the EMC probe in95.
The probe measures the global radiation of the FPGA chip. The resulting setup, with the
probe position near one of the power regulators, is shown in Figure 5.2a. Probes of different
dimensions, with perimeters varying from 1 cm to 2.5 cm, both shielded and unshielded,
provide very similar waveform after denoising, which implies a certain robustness of the
acquisition equipment.
The output of the probe is amplified by a 20 dB amplifier with bandwidth from 1 kHz
to 1 GHz, and then is sampled by a PicoScope 5244B oscilloscope, which has a 200 MHz
bandwidth and a maximally 500 MS/s sample rate for each channel. We use the 20 MHz
integrated hardware filter of the oscilloscope to avoid aliasing. The clock frequency of the
processor therefore should be set far lower since the EM signals are of much higher frequency
than the main clock. We set the clock to 1 MHz, and the EM signals should retain for our 200
MHz oscilloscope. Our results should be repeatable at higher frequencies using more costly
oscilloscopes that support higher bandwidths. The position and orientation of the probe is
then adjusted to gain signals of the maximal signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). Probe location is
re-adjusted for each SoC. The resulting SNR of the EM traces, computed by the ratio of
the variance of the signal and noise, is around 15 dB. A typical single-captured waveform is
shown in Figure 5.2b.
We have intentionally used low-cost signal acquisition equipment in order to show that
verification of low-end and/or legacy systems can be accomplished with only modest re-
sources. It is unrealistic to protect low-end and/or legacy systems using high-end equip-
ment, unlike the case in attacking. The most costly component in our experiment setup is
the off-the-shelf USB oscilloscope, at about $2,000; putting the total system cost at under
$2,100. Combining all components into a single “software integrity measurement device”
and manufacturing at scale is likely to further reduce costs.
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5.5 The test code and SoC test targets
We evaluate our approach on three SoCs, implemented in turn on our FPGA test-bed: a
NIOS II-based system capable of running an operating system; a simpler NIOS II-based
system with a more constrained resource configuration; and an OpenMSP430-based system
that is also operating system-capable.
5.5.1 System A: NIOS II-based SoC
Our first experiment is on a NIOS II-based SoC. NIOS II is a general-purpose 32-bit RISC
soft processor core from Altera.96 We choose the NIOS II/e Quartus II 13.1 web edition
(the latest edition for the target FPGA). NIOS II/e is designed for simple control logic
applications and/or inexpensive systems. It supports over a hundred instruction operations,
executed in a variable number of clock cycles, ranging from six to 38. (Our experiments
show it is actually seven to 39, contrary to specifications.) The HDL source is not available,
and the processor offers only limited configurability. The architecture contains no cache or
memory management units and does not perform branch prediction. It does not support
different operating modes or memory protection, so modern security mechanisms that rely
on processor-enforced separation cannot be used.
The NIOS II-based system is composed of the core, 40 kB M9K RAM, a timer, and a
16-bit parallel I/O connected using the Avalon bus. The system can run the FreeRTOS op-
erating system97 and several application tasks. The entire FPGA-implemented SoC consists
of the NIOS II-based system, a small control unit that supplies clock and reset signals to the
core, and a phase-locked loop (PLL). Programs are loaded and executed directly in RAM,
forming a complete SoC, i.e., with no bus interfaces outside the chip except the parallel I/O.
In addition, we remove the JTAG interface of the processor, as it is unlikely to be present
in a deployed device. The 1 MHz clock is obtained by using a PLL core connected to an
external 25 MHz clock source. We do not make any effort to enhance the side-channel
emissions when generating the system, so the experiment measures the typical EM radiation
of a NIOS II-based system.
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5.5.2 System B: Resource-constrained NIOS II-based SoC
The second SoC is also NIOS II-based, but simpler, to represent a “bare-boned” system that
does not have enough resources to run an operating system. It has only a 16 kB M9K RAM
for program and data memory, and an 8-bit parallel I/O. No timers are present. Otherwise
is identical to system A.
5.5.3 System C: OpenMSP430-based SoC
The third system is based on OpenMSP430, a 16-bit open-source MSP430 family-compatible
processor.98 It supports 27 core (many instructions are emulated) instructions and seven
addressing modes. Any valid combination of source and destination addressing modes is
possible in an instruction, unlike NIOS II, which uses explicit load and store operations.
Instructions of OpenMSP430 can be byte or word operations, whereas NIOS II supports
only 32-bit word operations for instructions other than load and store. The number of
clock cycles required for an instruction is variable (from one to six), depending both on the
instruction type and addressing modes.
The SoC consists of the processor, 32 kB M9K RAM for program memory and 4 kB for
data memory, a timer, and a 16-bit parallel I/O. Otherwise configuration is the same for all
three systems. Programs are compiled using MSP430-GCC, then binaries are converted to
an FPGA RAM initialization file, loaded and executed directly in RAM, forming a complete
SoC.
5.5.4 Test code
Ideally, we should exercise all the possible internal states of the target SoCs to build side-
channel models (i.e., template analysis). However, this is impractical since our preliminary
tests show that the EM radiation depends on instruction operations, operands, and the
content of the registers, memories, etc. (see Section 5.8). We can only build side-channel
models from a very limited number of programs and data configurations, compared with
the entire state space of the system. The validity of the resulting model is tested both by
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the reasonableness of its form and by the predictive power for side-channel emissions of new
programs and data. Our test code is a integration of the FreeRTOS operating system port for
each core (except system B) and re-implementation2 of a part of the CoreMark benchmark
suite99: integer matrix multiplication to test common operations like array access, loops, and
multiplication; floating-point multiplication for the floating point library; greatest common
divisor for integer division and recursion; quick-sort of vector data for array access and
recursion; list find for pointer operations; list quick-sort for list sort operations; string hash
for iterative and pointer operations; a finite state machine for control logic; and random
assembly code we generate for each core that avoids memory access and bypasses the native
compilers: one composed of logic/arithmetic instructions, and one composed of only five
types of logic/arithmetic instructions. The program binaries execute in a similar number of
clock cycles. We do not model the EM radiation of I/Os, or code that change system-level
behaviors, e.g., the timer intervals.
5.6 Modeling side-channels
The EM radiation of a CMOS circuit theoretically contains information about its internal
states1;100;101, but it is challenging to extract. Computing the EM field of complex circuits
is not only impractical, but also relies on knowledge of detailed design parameters.48;53;102
Both processors have complex architectures, the design details of NIOS II are unknown, and
the systems are mapped onto the FPGA base array. The resulting complexity and obscurity
pose a great challenge for side-channel profiling.
Our preliminary tests show that EM emissions of different operations largely overlap (c.f.
Section 5.8). Profiling EM emissions by using general classifiers as done in17;69;70;72 is un-
likely to succeed. Furthermore, knowing only the instruction operations does not guarantee
integrity since an attacker may write malware by varying only the operands and content of
registers/memory, while keeping the operations the same.
Chapter 3 has shown that the power consumption of a PIC microcontroller can be accu-
2To fit into available memory
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rately described as a set of linear functions of a few internal data-dependent activities, and
the contribution of different operations is negligible. We repeat the same experiment but
using EM measurements with the above probe, as shown in Section 3.4.3. The result shows
that, the linear model still holds for EM radiation! The only difference is the values of the
regression coefficients and omission of a near-DC component, which is linear to the HW of
instructions in the power model. This strongly suggests that we may be able to build similar
regression models for the FPGA-implemented SoCs.
We assume that the EM sample Yt at time t can be again modeled as a function of
internal states ~xt = (x1t, . . . , xpt) at t:
Yt = fq(~xt) +Nt
where Nt encloses remaining components in the EM radiation including noise and time-
dependent components. If we further assume that Nt is not dependent on time, then we can
build the model by regression techniques.
Since both processors execute instructions in a variable number of clock cycles, depending
on operands and bus traffic, we build side-channel models for each clock cycle and ignore the
stages. The sample rate of the oscilloscope is 500 MS/s, meaning that at least 500 regression
models can be built. In practice, however, most information is found at clock rising edges.
Yt is therefore the peak amplitude at rising edges of clock t. A sum of 26 points near the
peak gives slightly better results than using the single peak value. We denoise the traces
for use in regression by averaging over only 100 EM traces. Now the problem is to select
representative predictor variables ~xt.
5.6.1 Black-box analysis
Switches of internal signals and voltage differences of neighboring signals are a promising
initial choice for ~xt, supported by research on power consumption of FPGAs and general
circuits.48;51;53–55 Because the design details of NIOS II are not available, we initially treat
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the system as a black box and attempt to reason about internal activities directly from the
instruction set documents, as done in Chapter 3.4. However, the EM samples correlate poorly
with predictions. This is not surprising, as the target SoC systems are much more complex
than the PIC microcontroller. In particular, the FPGA is unlikely to possess regular long
wire segments as the dominant power-consuming memory interface in the PIC chip. To find
potential internal signals that may correlate with EM radiation, we turn to the simulation
models of the processor cores.
5.6.2 Grey-box analysis
For system A, register-transfer level (RTL) simulation gives runtime values of thousands
of signals, such as 35 bus signals. Gate-level post-fit simulation gives runtime values of at
least 8259 1-bit internal signals. For system Band system C, there are over 5800 and 12606
1-bit gate-level signals, respectively. The simulation result can be stored in a Value Change
Dump File (.vcd). EM radiation must be related with these signals in some form. However,
directly estimating f(·) does not work due to the sheer number of signals, and also due to
the multicollinearity among the signals (many signals are highly correlated with each other,
and thus only one signal in a correlated set may be a useful predictor). Some signals are
even identical – a simulation artifact. More variables are identical when considering switches
of signals (transitions from 0 to 1 or vice versa). However, removing duplicate variables
does not eliminate multicollinearity, showing that more complex correlations exist among
the signals and signal switches.
As a first step in selecting representative signals for ~xt, we test whether the EM radiation
has similar amplitudes when a subset of internal signals stay the same while others vary.
If so, we need only to retain the subset of signals for model building. Figure 5.3a shows
pairs of EM measurements (peak amplitudes) when bus signals are identical while other
signals vary. The x-axis is one EM measurement, and y-axis is another EM measurement.
Significant difference in EM measurements can be observed. Figure 5.3b shows pairs of EM
measurements when signal transitions (0-1 and 1-0 are regarded as different transitions) of
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bus signals are identical. These two figures mean that, no matter what the form of f(·) is,
the EM radiation is not determined only by the bus signals. This is in contrast with the PIC
chip, whose EM radiation is dominated by the Hamming distance of bus signals. Therefore,
we must include additional variables in ~xt. Because it is impractical to try arbitrary subsets
of signals, we have to turn to the gate-level signals, as RTL signals are optimized out in final
layout of the SoC system. However there are thousands of gate-level signals. To select the
most representative ones, we utilize the vendor-provided power estimation tool PowerPlay103,
therefore taking the grey box modeling approach, since PowerPlay encodes manufacturer’s
knowledge of the FPGA design.
PowerPlay is a tool for developers to estimate power consumption of an FPGA system to
allow selection of power supply and heat dissipation scheme. Total thermal power estimates
are claimed to have ±20% accuracy to silicon. However, since PowerPlay only reports
comparatively rough estimates of accumulative power consumption, it cannot be directly
used to solve our problem, which requires side-channel models for at least each instruction.
PowerPlay can, however, generate a set of signal names for use in a gate-level simulation
(which is in turn used for power estimation). It is reasonable to assume that these signals
contribute more significantly to power consumption (thus causing more EM radiation). For
system A, 1778 (out of 8259) gate-level signals are selected by PowerPlay, a huge reduction
in variables requiring post-processing.
We again test whether EM radiation is similar when the 1778 signals are identical while
others vary. Figure 5.3c shows pairs of EM measurements when signal transitions are identi-
cal for the 1778 variables, and Figure 5.3d shows pairs of EM measurements when the HDs
(which do not distinguish between 0-1 and 1-0) are identical. We do not find enough pairs
whose absolute values of the 1778 variables are identical. Nevertheless, Figure 5.3d already
illustrates that it is reasonable to select HD of the 1778 variables as ~xt, regardless the real
form of f(·) (Note that the set of points in Figure 5.3c is a subset of those in Figure 5.3d).
After modeling is finished, we retry using the original 8259 gate-level signals, and find that
indeed modeling with the 1778 signals gives the model better predictive power, validating
our choice. For system Band system C, the number of selected signals is 1280 and 2715,
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(c) Identical transitions of selected gate-level sig-
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(d) Identical Hamming distance of selected gate-
level signals
Figure 5.3: Measurements of system A when a subset of internal signals are identical
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respectively.
However, multicollinearity still exists among the selected variables. Since further divid-
ing the selected variables based on the SoC structure does not lead to improvement and
exhaustive search is computationally impractical, we turn to statistical techniques. Several
techniques can deal with predictors that have multicollinearity: ridge regression, partial
least-square regression (PLS), principal component regression (PCR), and stepwise regres-
sion. For the selected variables, it turns out that all regression techniques produce similarly
good regression models in terms of the coefficients of determination R2, MSE, and F -tests
in the model building step. To select better models, we perform model validation to measure
model reasonableness and predictive power.
5.7 Validation
We perform five-fold cross-validation to test the ability of the regression model in predicting
EM radiation. Among the test programs (Section 5.5.4), half are used for modeling and the
other half for testing (recall that they execute in a similar numbers of clock cycles). One
FPGA chip is used for building the EMmodel and a different FPGA chip of the same model is
used for testing the model. This stricter five-fold (compared to the common seven-fold or even
ten-fold) validation scheme is used because it is impractical to perform exhaustive exploration
and associated physical measurements. We are forced to use a limited set of programs for
side-channel profiling and derive a model which accurately predicts the experimental results
from all other possible programs. The goal is to evaluate the validity of using above variable
selection approach and regression techniques for side-channel profiling, rather than to obtain
a specific “best” model. Since some of the combinations of modeling/testing code may yield
better results, cross-validation eliminates this problem by repeating the modeling and testing
procedure using different programs for modeling and testing each time. We exhaustively
compute all 252 possible combinations.
We initially assume f(·) can be approximated as a first-order linear function. Pearson’s r
and Spearman’s ρ are used to evaluate the quality of our models – the larger the correlation,
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Figure 5.4: Pearson’s r for model validation, with the profiling (modeling) results to the left
and the testing (on another chip) results to the right; from the darkest bar to the lightest
are ridge regression, PLS, PCR, and stepwise regression.
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Figure 5.5: Spearman’s rho for model validation, with the profiling (modeling) results to
the left and the testing (on another chip) results to the right; from the darkest bar to the
lightest are ridge regression, PLS, PCR, and stepwise regression.
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the greater the predictive power. Pearson’s r is effective because we observe that slightly
moving the probe will only cause the amplitude of EM radiation to change linearly. We still
compute Spearman’s ρ, which can reveal nonlinear relationships between measurements and
models (r and ρ are equivalent when relationships are linear). Pearson’s r and Spearman’s
ρ are shown in Figure 5.4 and 5.5, respectively. r and ρ are almost identical, validating our
choice. When profiling and testing using the same FPGA chip, all the metrics, such as rs and
ρs, fps and fns (c.f. Section 5.8), are slightly better, as expected. In addition, regressing ~xt
always has the highest correlation coefficients when ~xt and Yt are precisely aligned in time, as
shown in Figure 5.6. A sharp peak occurs when the model prediction and real measurement
have no time offset, showing the soundness and validity of the parameter selection. The
parameters of each regression technique are selected to achieve best results for a few pre-
selected random modeling/testing combinations and then fixed for all the others: k = 0.5 for
ridge regression in all cases; number of components is 20 to 23 for PLS; cumulative is 0.99 for
PCR; stepwise regression computes the p value of F -test to test the model with or without
a term, padd is 0.05 and premove is 0.1, and the algorithm terminates when no add/remove
actions can improve the model to a statistically significant extent. Note that although for a
particular combination the best parameter varies, it does not change our conclusions.
The results show that (with few exceptions) linear regression models can predict EM
radiation of new programs with satisfactory accuracy, especially for system B. Adding the
absolute values of the signals (i.e., Hamming weights) to ~xt does not improve model per-
formance. PLS and PCR outperform other techniques and are stable in all cases (with no
unacceptably low-performing outliers r < 0.80). PLS and PCR have been used in various
domains such as chemistry and biology, where, similar to our situation, one observation is
associated with many variables.90;104 PLS and PCR have nearly identical performance, which
is interesting since unlike PLS, PCR does not take the response Yt into account when se-
lecting the predictors. The procedure of PCR is deterministic during model building and is
not affected by parameter selection. Principal component analysis (PCA) has been used in
side-channel analysis as a preprocessing step of pattern matching or classification to reduce
dimension and to denoise the sampled traces in time.69;85 We instead use PCA to eliminate
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Figure 5.6: Correlation of model prediction and measurement with sliding time window
during profiling; the x-axis is the time offset, and the y-axis is Pearson’s r computed from
the actual measurement and the model prediction which has an offset in time.
multicollinearity for regression. Note that there is no noise in the predictors ~xt, which are
not random variables.
The effectiveness of the regression models is further shown in Figure 5.7. The x-axis of
Figure 5.7a is the actual measurement for a testing program, and the y-axis is the model
prediction (of the best PLS model of system A). Although some outliers exist when the
amplitude of EM measurements is higher, most measurements and predictions fall along the
line of x = y. Figure 5.7b shows the Pearson’s r between the actual measurement of a testing
program and the model prediction which has an offset in time from the actual measurement.
The x-axis of Figure 5.7b is the time offset, and the y-axis is r. A sharp peak occurs when
the model prediction and real measurement have no time offset, showing the soundness and
validity of the model.
Second, we examine the resulting models for the reasonableness of their coefficients. The
coefficients of the best model in each case are shown in Figure 5.8 through 5.10. It is
interesting to observe that PLS, PCR, and stepwise regression result in similar regression
coefficients for each system, although the three techniques perform different procedures in
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(a) Model prediction (y-axis) versus measurements (x-axis)



























(b) Correlation of model prediction and measurement with sliding
time window
Figure 5.7: Model prediction and measurements for the best PLS model of system A
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regression. Note that the modeling/testing combinations to obtain the best models are
different for different techniques. There are both positive and negative coefficients, which
we believe is reasonable since unlike the case in power consumption, currents may generate
magnetic fields that cancel each other. Several selected signals are clock signals that switch
at each clock cycle. These signals do not provide information on internal states, and should
only contribute to the constant in the model. We observe that only ridge regression assigns
non-zero coefficients to these signals. Indeed, ridge regression performs worst in every case.




































Figure 5.8: The coefficients of the best models for system A, excluding the constant; from
the top to bottom are coefficients of ridge, PLS, PCR, and stepwise regression, respectively.
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Figure 5.9: The coefficients of the best models for system B, excluding the constant.
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Figure 5.10: The coefficients of the best models for system C, excluding the constant.
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PowerPlay reports that the M9K component consumes the majority (∼60%) of the core
dynamic power, but only a portion of M9K signals have larger positive regression coefficients
in our resulting models. We attempted to regress separately with the M9K signals including
memory and registers banks, as well as other signals reported in PowerPlay as consuming
more power, yet the resulting models are not better than original models, especially in
cross-validation. The .vcd files altered to observe power estimation for individual signals
do not seem to work with PowerPlay, producing unreasonable estimates that contradict our
observations (such as single signals that have excessive power consumption).
5.8 Applying results to software integrity checking
To enforce code integrity, we must guarantee that tampering with the internal states of the
system can be detected from side-channel measurements. Because the EM measurement of
the FPGA-based SoCs is a continuous-like variable, we cannot use the same side-channel
programming techniques with the PIC microcontroller. Instead, given the regression model,
we predict EM radiation of new programs by using the gate-level simulation. We then
determine whether tampering with the original code will be reflected in the emission or
not by some distance measure. Integrity checking is a hypothetical test of whether a given
measurement is from tampered code/data (undesired state) or not. The performance of this
integrity mechanism is quantified by (1) the false positive rate (when a normal system state
is flagged as tampering), and (2) the false negative rate (when tampering is performed, but
is not flagged).
There are typically two use scenarios for software integrity checking. One is to constantly
observe the system behavior, here to measure the EM radiation, so that tampering can be
detected as soon as tampered code or data start to affect system execution. The drawback
is high overhead as the acquisition equipment must be dedicated to the target device. The
other less costly scenario is to measure the EM radiation from time to time, at arbitrary
intervals, and to determine whether the device is running desirable code – a previous malware
execution may have changed internal states of the system. To answer whether we can utilize
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our EM acquisition equipment and models for protecting our target system in these scenarios,
we compute the statistics of EM radiation from real measurements, the regression models
and gate-level simulation.
We first consider a conventional attacker, who is unable to analyze the side-channel
information of the target system or unaware of the potential existence of side-channel-based
integrity checking mechanisms.
Table 5.1: False positive rates (%) for a(n) (aligned) single-captured EM trace
Threshold 0.90 0.85
Number of Cycles 7 14 21 7 14 21
System A 14.2 12.9 9.68 8.73 5.92 3.31
System B 13.1 10.3 8.57 8.52 6.14 3.08
System C 16.7 14.7 13.1 9.14 5.53 3.80
Table 5.2: False negative rates (%) for an aligned single-captured EM trace
Threshold 0.90 0.85
Number of Cycles 7 14 21 7 14 21
System A 20.6 4.65 1.75 30.5 9.83 4.01
System B 5.74 0.99 0.59 10.12 1.98 1.01
System C 0.81 0.18 0.13 1.54 0.22 0.14
Table 5.3: False negative rates (%) for an arbitrary single-captured EM trace
Threshold 0.90 0.85
Number of Cycles 7 14 21 7 14 21
System A 3.41 0.70 0.24 5.65 1.51 0.56
System B 1.43 0.16 0.09 2.93 0.38 0.16
System C 0.67 0.11 0.10 1.33 0.14 0.10
Recall that the SNR of our experiment is around 15 dB. Taking both environmental noise
and inaccuracy in model prediction (regression residual) into account, we obtain from the
best PLS models and EM measurements that for system A, 85.8% of the Pearson’s r between
seven-cycle single-captured traces (on the testing chip) with the model prediction (from
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the profiling chip) is greater than 0.90. Note that within seven cycles at most one instruction
can be executed. We can design the integrity checking mechanism by fixing the threshold to
0.90, and then compute the false positive rates of any 7-/14-/21-cycle trace for each system
from real measurements. Table 5.1 lists the false positive rates when the threshold is fixed to
0.90 and 0.85, respectively. Seven to 21 cycles are chosen because the actual number of clock
cycles per instruction for NIOS II is from seven to 39. While the actual number of clock
cycles per instruction for OpenMSP430 ranges from one to six, we use the same intervals for
comparison purpose.
The false negative rate is computed from the percentage of 7-/14-/21-cycle EM traces
of different code and/or data on the testing chip, but having r greater than the threshold
with the model prediction of the original code with desired data. Table 5.2 lists the false
negative rates when the EM traces are aligned with starts of execution, applicable to the
case in which tampered code/data executes in the same number of clock cycles with the
original code. Table 5.3 lists the false negative rates for arbitrary EM traces that are aligned
or misaligned with the original trace.
The results show that the probability of random malware evading the integrity check
is very low. Even compact malware (of very few instructions) can be detected reliably.
Both false positive and false negative rates decrease rapidly as the number of clock cycles
increases. When the number of cycles is fixed, there is a tradeoff between false positives and
false negatives: a lower threshold will reduce false positives at a cost of higher false negatives.
Note that the threshold and number of cycles can be computed to achieve desirable false
positive and false negative rates. Overall, the side-channel-based integrity check is effective
for a conventional attacker.
Next, we consider a side-channel-aware attacker who actively tries to compute alterna-
tive code that has near indistinguishable EM radiation from the original code. To do so,
the attacker needs to know the reverse mapping from the EM radiation to runtime states
including instructions and data. The effectiveness of our integrity checking scheme relies on
the hardness for an attacker to obtain such mapping.










































































































































Figure 5.11: EM measurements of instructions grouped by operations for system A; x-axis
is the number of clock cycles; y-axis is the EM measurement.
97
add, call), as done in previous research.17;69;70;72;105 This is to test whether EM radiation
is linked with operations as many researchers have assumed. We find that significant vari-
ation exists among instructions of the same operations, and EM measurements of different
operations are not discriminatory. Figure 5.11 shows the EM measurements grouped by op-
erations. Figure 5.12a shows an example in which even when executing the same instruction
(add r3,r16,r16), the EM radiation varies significantly. On the other hand, EM measure-
ments of executing different instructions may have nearly the same value. Figure 5.12b shows
an example in which the EM trace of one execution of add r3,r16,r16 has nearly the same
value with those of five different instructions of different operations, obtained by exhaustive
search.
This phenomenon can be quantified by class (i.e., operation) separability by using within-
class and between-class scatter matrices (c.f. Section 2.4.1). We compute the statistics of
53 common operations. The resulting J is 1.23, very close to one, which means that EM
radiation, when grouped by operations, is not well clustered and is nearly indistinguishable
from each other.
For system C, the number of clock cycles per instruction varies from one to six, and
depends on the addressing modes of the source and destination operands. Table 5.4 shows
class separability for different clock cycles. The resulting J is still very small, meaning that
EM radiation of different operations cannot be reliably distinguished from each other.
Table 5.4: Class separability J for system C
one cycle 3.81 four cycles 1.71
two cycles 16.63 five cycles 1.54
three cycles 7.51 six cycles 1.37
As shown in Sections 5.6.1 and 5.6.2, the EM model is a function of thousands of selected
gate-level signal switches. The operations, bus signals, and M9K signals, which can be eas-
ily deduced from code, only contribute to a small portion of EM variance. Even if exactly
the same instruction is executed, different runtime state of other signals will cause signif-
















































































































































or     r8,r6,r7
cmplt r8,r8,r6
ori    r8,r6,22322
mov   r8,r6
beq   r3,zero,14b6c
add   r3,r16,r16
(b) One execution of add r3,r16,r16 and five different instruc-
tions
Figure 5.12: EM measurements of add r3,r16,r16 for system A; red cross indicates the
same instance of executing add r3,r16,r16.
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thousands gate-level signals which cannot be manipulated arbitrarily, but rather through
the programming model of the processor. Furthermore, the gate-level signals are synthe-
sized and optimized results of the processor core, whose relationship with the assembly code
is unknown. Without knowing the design of the processor, as in the case of NIOS II, or
without the ability to deal with processor complexity, the attacker will have to exhaustively
search for alternative malware code that has similar EM radiation. In addition, each combi-
nation of operation and operands will result in a different internal state at each clock cycle.
As the length of EM measurements increases linearly, the complexity of searching increases
exponentially, effectively making the attack impractical.




Discussion and Future Work
We have quantified the effectiveness and generality of using low-cost acquisition equipment
to verify runtime states of different hardware platforms, including one microcontroller-based
SoC and three FPGA-based SoCs, against both conventional and side-channel-aware attack-
ers. Profiling and testing of FPGA-based SoCs use different chips (boards) of the same
model.
We show that by using our variable selection procedure and regression techniques, it
is possible to model clock-cycle-accurate single-captured side-channel emanations of com-
plex systems, with black-box or grey-box access to the system design. Linear regression
has also been used to break cryptographic hardware from side-channel leakage.82;89;107;108
Side-channel profiling for integrity checking is however very different from that for breaking
cryptographic hardware. For cryptographic hardware, what are chiefly concerned are usu-
ally special time points when side-channels leak key material information during multiple
executions of the same cryptographic routine. It therefore does not give the whole picture of
the side-channel emissions of a device. In contrast, for integrity checking to detect one-time
execution of malware, we must extract as much information as possible for each cycle in
a single measurement, including but not confined to, instruction operations, operands, and
register and memory content.
Our integrity checking methods are external. The verifier does not exist within the device
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under test, and therefore is invisible to attackers who penetrate the device. The measurement
by the verifier is passive and non-invasive, making it a particularly attractive solution for
already-deployed systems.
We have shown that for a PIC microcontroller, it is possible to perform “side-channel
programming”, in which developers utilize side-channel characteristics of the target device
to rewrite code in a way that the device is guaranteed to reach from a given initial state to
a unique final state when the side-channel constraints are satisfied. Algorithms on how to
generate such programs and side-channel constraints are given.
For the FPGA-based SoCs, we have also shown the effectiveness of using passive EM
radiation to verify the internal states of SoCs of completely different logic and software
configurations. This strongly implies that our approach may be applied to diverse systems
of different hardware platforms. Indeed, side-channels have higher potentials than expected
to be used for constructive purposes.
Reproducing the work. Some suggestions can be given to interested researchers who
would like to reproduce the work on the same devices that we have used and also on different
devices. While power consumption can be reliably measured by using the standard shunt
resistor approach, there is some uncertainty in the EM measurement since we have used a
hand-made loop probe instead of a commercial probe with known electric parameters such
as bandwidth and gain. Our intention of making the probe ourselves is to adjust the probe
dimension in the preliminary study (and to reduce cost). More rigorous treatment of the
design of the sniffer probe for side-channel analysis can be found in13. To simply repeat the
experiment, one only needs to follow the design of the EMC probe in95. The orientation
and position of the probe should be adjusted to obtain the maximal SNR. As mentioned in
Section 5.4, we have found several positions on the board where the captured EM signals
are of similar waveform.
There are also concerns about the environment noise which may reduce the effectiveness
of the EM-based integrity checking. Our EM experiment has been conducted in a normal
laboratory environment with several working computers nearby, and the device is not EM
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shielded. We have not used any anechoic materials. Even the JTAG connector is not
unplugged during measurement. This is to show that our approach works in an ordinary
noisy environment. The resulting SNR is around 15 dB, as mentioned in Section 5.4. It
appears that near-field magnetic measurement is not very sensitive to noise.
Inherent side-channel leakage. Our experiments have measured the inherent side-channel
emanations of devices, without any effort to increase the side-channel leakage. This is be-
cause we aim to make no modifications on existing hardware, so that our approach is a
pure external verifier and can be used for legacy and deployed systems. On the other hand,
one may try to increase side-channel leakage so that it may be easier for integrity checking.
While it is possible to cause intentional leakage by for example adding an antenna, it requires
hardware modification and will inevitably cause interference with the original device. More
generally, increasing side-channel leakage conflicts with EMI/EMC requirements.
Future work. Since our side-channel models are based on internal signals that are com-
puted either from the semantic models or the simulation models, it can be inferred that
directly applying the approach for integrity checking requires the system to be determinis-
tic. For example, no context switching should happen when measuring a target program.
To what extent our approach can be applied for non-deterministic systems is left for future
work. In addition, we also plan to try more advanced measurement equipment that may
extract side-channel emanations of only a portion of the system and examine how this will
help in software integrity checking.
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